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 In absolute terms, Russian conventional military capabilities in 2016 were considerably 
better than they were at any point of the post-Soviet period. Relative to the 
conventional military power of the United States and NATO, Russia’s position remains 
relatively weak. Russian defence spending has seen a steady increase since 2000, 
but the country’s military budget remains but a fraction of that of the US and of the 
NATO. In terms of the number and quality of high-tech weaponry, Russia continues to 
lag far behind Western competitors and especially the US.  
 
 Russian military posturing has become more aggressive in recent years. However, 
preparation for offensive action is not the only plausible explanation for these actions. 
Another use of conventional military power is ‘swaggering’ – a conspicuous display of 
one’s military might ‘to look and feel more powerful or important’. Russian swaggering 
has already yielded considerable results. Although Russia’s relative conventional 
military power is nowhere near the strength of NATO, international reactions to the 
display of its revived armed forces have enhanced its global image to an extent that 
far exceeds its actual material capabilities.  
 
 Russia sees the possession of a huge arsenal of nuclear weapons, equal to that of the 
USA, as a central component of its state power that secures it not only invincibility 
against external threats but also authority in the international arena. Over the last 15 
years, Russia has invested a lot of material resources in modernizing its nuclear 
capabilities. However, in the context of the unfolding economic crisis, Russia is fast 
sinking into a quagmire of military-economic overstretch. 
 
 Russia pursues a policy of total secrecy regarding non-strategic nuclear weapons. 
Moscow firmly refuses to enter into any arms control negotiations on these weapons, 
so the preliminary talks and unilateral initiatives undertaken in the late 1980s have 
been discontinued. 
 
 After almost two decades of neglect of the military economy Russia once again has a 
strong defence industry.  In terms of employment and the range of weapons systems 
and other military equipment it produces, the Russian defence industry is one of the 
largest in the world, second only to the USA and probably still larger than that of China. 
It is able to develop and manufacture all categories of armament, from nuclear 
weapons to small arms. As with the USA and China, it also exhibits a marked degree 
of self-reliance, currently being enhanced further in response to sanctions imposed by 
NATO and European Union member countries following Russia actions in Ukraine in 
2014.  
 
 It has been a central goal of the Putin presidency to restore Russia's military capability 
to a level considered adequate to ensure the country's security, even though the 
achievement of the goal has placed a burden on the economy. To a large extent the 
goal has been fulfilled. 
 
 The recent and ongoing recession in Russia has led many to suggest that Russia is 
an ailing economic power. But this misses some important developments. Measured 
at purchasing power parity, Russia’s GDP was, despite the recession, $3.4 trillion in 
2015, making Russia the 6th largest economy in the world.  Measured at PPP, per 
capita income is nearly $25,000, 44% of the US level and 65% of the EU average. 
 
 Russia’s proficiency as a producer of technology reveals the uneven nature of Russian 
economic power. While high-technology exports account for less than 3% of Russia’s 
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total exports, there are several areas in which the country is a world leader. For 
instance, Russia is one of the leading powers in the sphere of nuclear energy.  
 
 Despite Russia’s strengths in the sphere of armaments production, the deficiencies 
evident across the wider range of civilian technology are likely to serve as a source of 
economic weakness in the future.  
 
 Natural resources account for the vast majority of Russian exports, as well as making 
a huge contribution to domestic tax revenues and GDP. In this respect, Russia remains 
as dependent on natural resources as the Soviet Union once was, with its economic 
and geopolitical fortunes heavily influenced by movements in global natural resource 
prices.  
 
 The disparity between Russia’s dependence on natural resource exports and its 
relatively small degree of market power reveals the crucial paradox of Russian 
economic power: Russia relies to an exceptionally large degree on the extraction and 
sale of range of goods over which it exerts very little in the way of price-forming 
influence. In this respect, Russia’s real economic sovereignty is severely constrained. 
 
 Moscow has frequently been accused of using its energy resources to gain diplomatic 
leverage. It has certainly exploited its dominance of natural gas supply to coerce post-
Soviet states over the past decade. However, it is very difficult to wield the energy 
weapon to good effect. Russia’s reputation both as a supplier of energy and as an 
international partner has been tarnished as a result of its apparent willingness to use 
its energy resources and control over export infrastructure as an instrument of political 
influence.  
 
 Despite concern about Russia’s apparent willingness to use its energy resources as a 
political weapon, it should not be forgotten that it needs European markets as much 
as Europe needs Russian oil and gas. Whilst Asia represents a large potential market 
in the long-term, the pipeline infrastructure is not yet in place. Capturing this market 
ultimately depends upon maintaining steady supplies of oil and gas to European 
markets. Wielding energy as a weapon against European states will ultimately be self-
defeating for Moscow. 
 
 Over the past decade, Russia has invested heavily in sectors of public policy relevant 
to soft power. Senior establishment figures start from the assumption that Russia 
operates under conditions increasingly characterised as 'information warfare' or 'hybrid 
warfare'.  
 
 Russian soft power seeks to re-shape international norms and values in ways that are 
conducive to the pursuit of Russian interests. As well as casting Russia as a valuable 
international player, this should foster an aura of legitimacy and credibility around 
Russian modes of socio-economic development, particularly by questioning the 
motivation and consistency of Western policy.  
 
 Russia views the post-Soviet space as an area of great strategic significance and has 
been frustrated and humiliated by Western integration projects which are seen to have 
progressed without due consultation with Russia. In the countries of the former Soviet 
Union Russia projects forward-focused narratives on culture, values and inter-state 
cooperation due to similarity in political context and lingering economic integration.  
 
 However, Moscow’s approach to soft power implementation has tended to be rather 
declarative, stating broad aims without concrete steps and timelines for their 
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realisation, or involving activities conducted without evaluating their effectiveness in 
achieving stated goals. In some cases, soft power initiatives have resembled the living 
out of imperial nostalgia with the domestic constituency in mind, and have served 
rather to alienate the wider public abroad. 
 
 It is likely that Russia will become more culturally competitive in the post-Soviet space 
in the coming years.  
 
 Russia’s soft power beyond the post-Soviet space can be understood as its ability to 
project strategic narratives that resonate with specific audiences, and that amplify or 
shape their understandings of the world and their political preferences in line with 
Russia’s foreign policy objectives. 
 
 Russia’s strategic narratives, disseminated through its propaganda instruments and 
other overt and covert methods of engaging with civil society actors in targeted 
countries, are carefully tailored to specific concerns of ‘communities of grievances’. 
These include various anti-establishment sentiments both on the right and on the left 
ends of the political spectrum, Eurosceptic, anti-American, anti-immigration and anti-
globalisation sentiments, grievances related to austerity policies, etc. 
 
 The key advantage of Russia’s propaganda outlets is that they can easily penetrate 
the echo chambers of ‘communities of grievances’. Their ability to amplify anti-
establishment grievances poses a serious challenge both to the domestic stability of 
Russia’s opponents and to the unity of their responses to Russia. 
 
 Russian discourse on international law has become particularly important in the last 
decade. For Russia, normative power consists of resistance to US hegemony, at both 
regional and global levels, and of resistance to what Russia sees as Washington’s 
attempts to overturn existing international norms in the sphere of international law.  
 
 Russia does not necessarily wish to be either ‘norm-maker’ or ‘norm-taker’ but rather 
a co-creator with the West of a normative order. However, this rests also on the 
assumption of a kind of Monroe Doctrine and acceptance of ideas of spheres of 
influence in the former Soviet space, which may not correspond to EU or US policies. 
 
 Paradoxically there are few specialists on international law either in Russia’s Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs or in the State Duma. Russia’s lack of a ‘knowledge bank’ of 
expertise in the area of international law not only puts it a disadvantage, but leads 
further to a distancing from the realm of so-called cosmopolitan law.  
 
 Although recent events in Ukraine and Syria have contributed to the perception of 
Russia as a powerful player in the international arena, most notably in Europe, the 
domestic challenges that Russia is facing present a different picture. The Russian state 
suffers from clear structural weaknesses - weak institutions, corruption, huge regional 
differences and a diverse population in terms of religion and ethnicity. 
 
 Two trends are particularly prominent in Russian domestic politics –building an image 
of Russia as a Great Power with official patriotism and civilizational arguments; and 
the securitization of society, especially through the domestic legal framework. 
However, both trends are slowly distancing society from the political elite, constantly 
undermining the efficiency of the state, and putting brakes on any fundamental 




Introduction: Dimensions of Russia’s Power 
 
Natasha Kuhrt (King’s College London) and Valentina Feklyunina (Newcastle University) 
 
This report seeks to ‘measure’ or ‘assess’ Russia’s power in multiple dimensions. The impetus 
came from the sense that we have reached a point in the ‘West’ where it is difficult to obtain 
reliable and balanced analyses of Russian power, whether that be economic, military, or ‘soft’ 
power. Over the past few years, expert discussions of Russia’s capabilities, intentions and 
ambitions have often produced radically different accounts of Russia’s trajectory – from 
inflated portrayals of an all-powerful rising Russia to pessimistic predictions of Russia’s 
dramatic decline.  
 
Any assessment of Russia’s power inevitably suffers from several major problems. First, our 
attempts to ‘measure’ Russia’s power are often complicated by a lack of reliable data. This is 
particularly evident in any analysis of Russia’s defence industry or of Russia’s military power, 
with crucial data remaining classified.  
 
Second, several key dimensions of Russia’s power are difficult to ‘measure’ in general. For 
example, while Russia is often assumed to have developed significant advantages over its 
opponents in the realm of propaganda, evaluating the impact of Russian propaganda remains 
a methodological challenge. Russia’s alleged intervention in the US Presidential election is a 
case in point. 
 
Third, almost every dimension of Russia’s power displays a striking paradox whereby serious 
weaknesses and significant strengths are observable simultaneously. For instance, Russia’s 
reliance on the export of natural resources provides it with enormous advantages in terms of 
its international position and its short-term economic wellbeing, while, at the same time, 
exposing it to external shocks and severely limiting its ability to undertake much-needed 
structural reforms. 
 
Finally, discussions of Russia’s power and intentions have once again become dangerously 
politicised, which makes any attempt at a balanced analysis ever more difficult.  
 
Written by leading experts in the fields of Russian politics, security and economy, all sections 
of this report bear in mind the above limitations. At the same time, they, to a large extent, echo 
a popular saying that ‘Russia is never as strong as she looks, nor as weak’ (as astutely 
emphasised by one of the contributors in relation to Russia’s economic power).  
 
While this report does not pretend to be providing an indisputable measure of Russian power, 
it does give a snapshot of the key issues, including Russian capabilities/infrastructure and 
intentions, in nine dimensions of Russia’s power. Although the list of these dimensions is not 
exhaustive (for example, it does not include the increasingly important dimension of Russia’s 
cyber power), it nevertheless allows us to consider Russia’s major weaknesses and strengths, 
and to provide recommendations for policymakers in dealing with Russia in these multiple 
areas. 
 
The work on this report has been generously supported by the Working Group on Russian 
and Eurasian Security of the British International Studies Association (BISA). All sections of 
this report were originally presented at a policy workshop organised by the Working Group at 
King’s College London in May 2016. We are also very grateful for generous support to the 
Department of War Studies at King’s College London and the School of Geography, Politics 




Russia’s Conventional Military Power1 
 
Bettina Renz (Nottingham University, UK) 
 
 
A strong military is central to a state’s ability to project power on an international level. As 
Hans Morgenthau noted, as long as anarchy obtains in the international system, ‘armed 
strength as a threat or a potentiality is the most important material factor making for the political 
power of nations’.2 Russia’s quest for great power status dates back centuries and did not 
cease with the end of the Cold War in 1991.3 Military power was central to the making of the 
tsarist empire and it was also a strong military, above all other tools of influence, which 
elevated the Soviet Union to the status of a superpower during the Cold-war years. From this 
point of view, it is not surprising that, after years of allowing the Russian military to fall into 
disrepair, the country’s leadership set out on an extensive programme of military 
modernisation in 2008. 
 
Relinquishing armed strength and accepting the resulting loss of great power status was never 
an option for post-Soviet Russia. Although the Russian Federation’s first military doctrine 
issued in 1993 declared that the country no longer regarded any particular state as an enemy, 
this did not mean that the projection of military power was no longer seen as important. The 
doctrine envisaged a decrease in force levels and prioritised the development of a military 
able to deal with regional conflicts.4 At the same time, the doctrine indicated serious ambitions 
in the realm of conventional military power. It envisaged investments in R&D towards the 
creation of high-tech equipment, including electronic warfare capabilities, stealth technology 
and advanced naval weaponry – a direct response to the accomplishments of the ‘revolution 
in military affairs’ demonstrated by the US coalition in the 1991 Gulf War.5  
 
During the Yeltsin years, Russia’s ambitions for its conventional military forces did not match 
reality. Although central components of the 2008 modernisation programme, such as the need 
to professionalise, create rapid reaction forces and procure advanced technology, were 
considered from the early 1990s, no programme for reorganisation up until 2008 led to 
fundamental transformation. Yeltsin-era plans for reforms faltered not least owing to the 
country’s dire economic situation.6 At the same time, the Russian leadership became ever 
more acutely aware of the fact that a strong nuclear arsenal was not enough to uphold the 
country’s great power status. The belief that the centrality of military power in international 
relations would diminish after the Cold War had ended was short-lived. Other countries, and 
the US and China in particular, continued to modernise their armed forces at a rapid pace 
while Russia fell further and further behind. The poor state of its conventional forces also 
restricted Russia’s options at a time when the West started to show an ever more overt 
readiness to use war as an instrument of policy.7 
 
  
                                                          
1 An expanded version of this paper is available at: 
http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/issues/Summer_2016/6_Renz.pdf 
2 H. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, 5th ed., New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973, p. 29. 
3 I.B. Neumann, ‘Russia as a Great Power, 1815-2007’, Journal of International Relations and 
Development, 11 (2008): 128-151. 
4 W.D. Jackson, ‘Encircled Again: Russia’s Military Assesses Threats in a Post-Soviet World’, Political 
Science Quarterly. 117(3) (2002): 373-400, p. 378. 
5 R. Pipes, ‘Is Russia Still an Enemy?’ Foreign Affairs, 76(5) (1997): 65-78, pp. 75-6. 
6 B. Renz, ‘Russian Military Reform: Prospects and Problems’, RUSI Journal, (2010): 58-62. 
7 H. Strachan, The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Comparative Perspective, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013, p. 22. 
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Measuring Russia’s conventional military power 
 
In absolute terms, there is no doubt that Russian conventional military capabilities in 2016 are 
considerably better than they were at any point of the post-Soviet period. After almost two 
decades of neglect when ‘reform’ equated to little more than to the downsizing of the legacy 
Soviet mass conscription army and barely any new equipment was procured, the 2008 
modernisation programme emphasised the efficiency of command structures, the move from 
mobilisation to rapid reaction and the modernisation of weapons and technology. The 
achievements of this programme have been well documented and were also demonstrated, 
on a limited scale, in the interventions in Ukraine and Syria. Crimea showed an unexpected 
speed of decision-making and efficiency in command and control, which was replicated in the 
large-scale exercises conducted along the Ukrainian border as a show of force. These 
exercises were also evidence that improvements in strategic mobility had been made, and 
that the Russian armed forces were now able to deploy and sustain a large force over several 
months.8 In Syria, Russia demonstrated that it now had the capability to carry out limited out-
of-area operations. This came as a surprise to many observers, who did not believe that 
Russia had the necessary sea and airlift capabilities. Syria provided further proof that the 
Russian air force had recovered from years of neglect. Precision-guided munitions were used 
in combat for the first time, as were unmanned aerial vehicles for the acquisition of target 
information and battle damage assessment. The launching of cruise missiles against ground 
targets in Syria from the Caspian and Mediterranean Sea revealed the extent of Russian 
advances in naval strike capabilities.9 
 
Estimating Russian conventional military capabilities in absolute terms tells us little about the 
country’s conventional military power. This is because a state’s military power, like its power 
as an actor in the international system as a whole, is always relative to the power of other 
states.10 Relative to the militaries of the other former Soviet states (except from the Baltic 
states as part of the NATO alliance), the recent modernisation programme has not 
substantially altered the power balance. Russian conventional military power in this region 
was unrivalled even before the latest reforms. Relative to the conventional military power of 
other great powers, and the United States and NATO as a military alliance in particular, 
Russia’s position remains relatively weak. Although defence spending alone is insufficient as 
a measure of relative military power, the sheer discrepancy in this respect is significant.  
Russian defence spending has seen a steady increase since Vladimir Putin’s election as 
president in 2000, but the country’s military budget remains but a fraction of that of the US and 
of the NATO. In terms of the number and quality of high-tech weaponry, Russia continues to 
lag far behind Western competitors and especially the US. Strides have been made in 
reforming the Russian defence industry, but serious organisational and structural problems 
need to be resolved before Russia can start rivalling the West with advanced military 
technology.  
 
Regarding troop numbers it is generally assumed that Russian military strength in 2016 
comprises up to 800,000 personnel. This is sizeable even compared to the US’ 1,400,000 
active soldiers, but more than half of the Russian armed forces continues to be made up of 
poorly trained conscripts.11 When it comes to the combat readiness and operational 
                                                          
8 K. Giles, Russia’s New ‘Tools’ for Confronting the West: Continuity and Innovation in Moscow’s 
Exercise of Power, Chatham House Research Paper (2016). Available at: 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/russias-new-tools-confronting-west, accessed 30.01.2017. 
9 D. Gorenburg, What Russia’s Military Operation in Syria Can Tell us about Advances in its Capabilities, 
PONARS Policy Memo. 424 (2016). Available at: http://www.ponarseurasia.org/node/8320, accessed 
30.01.2017. 
10 J.J. Mearsheimer, ‘The False Promise of International Institutions’, International Security, 19(3) 
(1994/5): 5-49, pp. 10-11. 
11 Military Balance 2015. 
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capabilities of Russian conventional forces relative to those of the US, there is little reason to 
assume that Russia is ‘catching up’. Russian troops have trained the fighting of large-scale 
joint inter-service operations in numerous military exercises in the past few years. However, 
Russia’s reformed ground forces have never been tested in an actual conflict situation, 
because both Crimea and Syria were so limited in scope and size.12 
 
Implications of Russia’s conventional military power for NATO and the West 
 
What matters most to Russia’s neighbours and the West is not so much whether Russia has 
the capabilities to defeat a variety of potential opponents, but whether it has the intention of 
doing so. Better military capabilities are certainly offering Russia more opportunity for the use 
of force. Russia’s air campaign in Syria was enabled by improvements in conventional 
capabilities that the country simply did not have ten years ago. At the same time, better 
capabilities do not necessarily mean that Russia will now use military force indiscriminately, 
either in pursuit of expansionist policies or in direct confrontation with NATO. 
 
It is beyond doubt that Russian military posturing, especially vis-à-vis neighbouring NATO 
states, has become more aggressive in recent years. However, preparation for offensive 
action is not the only plausible explanation for these actions. Conventional military power is 
routinely wielded for purposes other than the fighting of actual wars, such as deterrence or 
reassurance. Another use of conventional military power is ‘swaggering’. This has been 
defined by Robert Art as the conspicuous display by a state or statesman of one’s military 
might ‘to look and feel more powerful or important, to be taken seriously by others in the 
councils of international decision-making, to enhance the nation’s image in the eyes of 
others’.13 After years of decay during which the West had written off Russia as a global military 
actor, such swaggering, coupled with the interventions in Ukraine and Syria, has been an 
effective way of enhancing the international image of Russia’s shiny and new military.  Given 
the importance for Russia of being viewed as a great power this makes a great deal of sense. 
Swaggering can ‘bring prestige “on the cheap”, especially in a situation when the country is 
not in a position to project the image of being a great power by other means. 
 
The revival of Russian conventional military power presents NATO and the West with an 
uncomfortable reality. Forcing Russia into reversing, or putting a stop, to this process is not 
an option. Moreover, as long as the right of states to use force persists in international politics, 
there is no easy way of stopping Russia from resorting to military force in certain situations. 
However, there are choices to be made in deciding how to respond to these developments, 
especially when it comes to Russian military posturing vis-à-vis NATO. Potential 
consequences of any responses need to be weighed up carefully.  
 
Russian military swaggering, used to re-establish itself as a serious actor in global politics, 
has already yielded considerable results. Although Russia’s relative conventional military 
power is nowhere near the strength of NATO, international reactions to the display of its 
revived armed forces have arguably enhanced its global image to an extent that far exceeds 
its actual material capabilities. This should be kept in mind when decisions on NATO force 
deployments on Russia’s western borders are made. Reassurance measures, if not clearly 
communicated, could potentially lead to more, rather than less aggressive Russian posturing 
by indirectly inflating the image of its military internationally and amongst the Russian 
population. Moreover, it is already obvious that Russia is not interpreting NATO’s actions in 
the spirit intended, that is, as defensive measures aimed at reassuring member states in the 
east. Continuing to interpret NATO’s actions as a threat to its national interests and security, 
                                                          
12 J. Norberg, Training to Fight: Russia’s Major Military Exercises, 2011-2014, Swedish Defence 
Research Agency (FOI), FOI Report, FOI-R-4128-SE (2015). Available at: 
https://www.foi.se/reportsummary?reportNo=FOI-R--4128--SE, accessed 30.01.2017. 
13 R. J. Art, ‘To What Ends Military Power?’, International Security, 4(4) (1980): 3-35, p. 10. 
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Russia has reacted by stepping up its own military posture. The experience of the Cold War 
has taught us what an ever-more intense security dilemma can lead to. If current trends of 
uncompromising rhetoric and posturing on both sides continue, a new arms race will be the 
likely outcome. Although the West is better placed economically and militarily to win such a 
race, it would be costly for all states involved. The danger of unintended or intended escalation 
is also worth bearing in mind. Doing nothing is clearly not an alternative to NATO’s current 
policies towards Russia. The question is whether a middle ground between a policy leading to 




The Nuclear Dimension of Russian Military Power 
 
Pavel Baev (Peace Research Institute Oslo) 
 
 
Russia tends to see the possession of a huge arsenal of nuclear weapons, equal to that of the 
USA, as a central component of its state power that secures it not only invincibility against 
external threats but also authority in the international arena. It is, in fact, not that easy to define 
the exact scope of this nuclear component, because, besides the strategic forces (on which 
we have much reliable data), it includes also the non-strategic munitions (about which we 
know alarmingly little) as well as the various components of strategic defence, from satellites 
to anti-missiles, and the research units and enterprises of the nuclear industry. Even if we 
bracket the latter part out of this analysis (i.e. assuming that the Rosatom corporation 
constitutes an element of the energy complex), we still have to deal with a hugely complex 
system, which is not organized by a coherent command structure. 
 
Over the last 15 years, which is approximately the timeframe of Vladimir Putin’s “reign”, Russia 
has invested a lot of material resources in modernizing its nuclear capabilities. Remarkably, 
what was in the last decade a key confirmation of Russia’s “revival”, has become in the last 
few years a major compensation for its decline. The Russian leadership assumes that 
sustained investments in nuclear projects help in checking the erosion of its international 
prestige; yet paradoxically, this commitment has become a significant driver of the decline. 
This proposition might appear dubious, but in the context of unfolding economic crisis, it is 
clear that the heavy priority set on nuclear weapon systems in the 2020 Armament program 
(adopted in 2011), has exacerbated problems with its implementation, and creates major 
issues with setting the guidelines in the still not approved 2025 Armament program. The 
nuclear lobby demands prioritization for its half-implemented projects, and this effective 
pressure prevents the allocation of necessary resources not only toward conventional forces, 
but also to badly underfunded social programs. While asserting its nuclear might, Russia is 
fast sinking into a quagmire of military-economic overstretch. 
 
Fine-tuning strategic parity 
 
Maintaining  parity with the USA in strategic delivery systems and warheads, as stipulated by 
the New START treaty (2011), is seen by the Russian leadership as crucially important for 
upholding strategic stability and own international prestige. Yet, there is a striking difference 
in the development of relevant programs: while Russia has been undertaking massive efforts 
in deploying new ICBMs and submarines, the US leadership doesn’t plan to modernize its 
strategic triad until the next decade. It is only China that is presently implementing 
programmes to upgrade its strategic capabilities, comparable with the Russian effort. 
 
Traditionally, land-based intercontinental missiles constitute the strongest part of Russian 
strategic forces, and upgrades of this component are generally on track. The delays with the 
introduction of new “heavy” ICBM Sarmat (RS-28 or SS-X-30) are compensated by the 
prolongation of service life of Voevoda (R-36M2 or SS-18) and Stiletto (UR-100NUTTH or SS-
19) respectively to 2022 and 2019. The retirement of Topol (SS-25) goes hand in hand with 
the deployment of Topol-M (SS-27) and its MIRVed version Yars (RS-24) in silo-based and 
road-mobile variants (and possibly even as rail-mobile Barguzin). The main advantages of the 
Rocket Forces are the integrity of command, relatively low cost (despite the wide variety of 
models), high reliability and low risk of technical failure. 
 
The picture is very different with the naval “leg”, where the number of submarines has 
decreased nearly tenfold since the Soviet era, and the deployment of the new Borey-class 
generation of platforms encounters costly complications. Three submarines of this class are 
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performing missions despite the fact that the failure-prone Bulava missile has not completed 
the full complement of tests and the one test in 2015 was only partially successful. The huge 
costs of these projects (four more submarines are under construction) come on top of heavy 
maintenance, since the Navy command insists on having strategic naval bases on both the 
Kola Peninsula and the Kamchatka, with submarines of various types in the Northern and 
Pacific fleets. The high frequency of minor accidents indicates a significant risk of a technical 
catastrophe similar to the Kursk disaster, which marked the beginning of Putin’s “era” in 2000. 
 
The airforce “leg” of the strategic triad has traditionally been the weakest and the most 
underfunded but, rather paradoxically, it has been exploited most extensively in the newly-
launched confrontation for various demonstrations of power. Russian strategic bombers 
approached the airspace of Norway, the UK, Canada and USA during regular patrols and 
performed a number of combat missions in Syria. This increased intensity of work took its toll 
on the ageing fleet, and two Tu-95MS (Bear-H) bombers crashed in summer 2015, the worst 
losses on the record. The development of a new PAK-DA strategic platform is encountering 
delays, so Moscow seeks to resume production of the Tu-160 bombers, which nevertheless 
cannot be achieved before 2023. 
 
Condemning and upgrading strategic defence 
 
The implementation of US and NATO programs for defence against ballistic missiles is 
furiously criticised by Russian propaganda and is defined as one of the main external threats 
in both the Military Doctrine (2014) and the National Security Strategy (2015). Moscow is 
clearly trying to incite opposition against the European missile defence system and to join 
forces with China in opposing the deployment of US Terminal High Altitude Area Defense 
(THAAD) system in South Korea. It is characteristic of this political stance, nevertheless, that 
while Putin promised an effective response to the opening of the US missile-interceptor base 
in Deveselu, Romaina in May 2016, no practical counter-measures have in fact been taken. 
 
The fact of the matter is that political condemnation of US and NATO plans goes hand in hand 
with the development of Russia’s own strategic defence forces. Historically, the main element 
of this force has been the multi-layered A-135 anti-ballistic missile defence system around 
Moscow, which features both short-range and long-range interceptor-missiles with nuclear 
warheads. The short-range interceptors 53T6 (Gazelle) are regularly tested, while the 
development of a mobile S-500 surface-to-air missile system is encountering delays related 
to technological problems with the 77N6 missile, which is supposed to have capabilities for 
long-range interception. At the same time, the S-400 (Triumph) surface-to-air missile system 
is actively deployed, including to create the anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) bubble around 
the Latakia airbase in Syria. The 40N6 missile for the S-400 system was tested for the altitude 
range up to 56 km, which gives it limited anti-ballistic missile capability. 
 
Russia is also investing heavily in the upgrades of its extensive early warning system, with 
new Voronezh-DM/VP radars switched on in Kaliningrad and Irkutsk and under construction 
in Vorkuta and Olenegorsk. At the same time, there are persistent setbacks with launching 
and maintaining orbit military satellites, so the space component of the early warning system 
has effectively ceased to exist. Western sanctions have denied Russia access to crucial 
technological components for the new Tundra generation of satellites, so the program is in 
disarray. Nevertheless, Russian Space command is moving quickly ahead with testing the 
Nudol anti-satellite system.   
 
Preserving ambiguity about non-strategic weapons 
 
In contrast with the apparent transparency around its strategic arsenal, Russia pursues a 
policy of total secrecy regarding non-strategic nuclear weapons. Their very existence is 
ignored in the Military Doctrine (2014) and other official military documents and field manuals; 
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there is hardly any training for operations on nuclear battlefields. Moscow firmly refuses to 
enter into any arms control negotiations on these weapons, so the preliminary talks and 
unilateral initiatives undertaken in the late 1980s have been discontinued. Russia persists with 
demanding the withdrawal of US non-strategic nuclear weapons from Europe (about 200 B-
61 gravity bombs in Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Turkey), and denies the risks 
associated with the fact that the number of nuclear warheads for various land, air and sea 
non-strategic weapons systems is greater than the well-documented and verifiable stockpile 
of strategic warheads. 
 
The main concerns in “frontline” NATO member-states are focused on nuclear warheads for 
the Iskander (SS-26 Stone) short-range ballistic or cruise missile system, which could be 
deployed in the Kaliningrad region and in Crimea. The range of this system is supposed to be 
500 km, which leaves it out of the INF Treaty (1988), but the range with a nuclear warhead is 
uncertain. In 2011, Russia conducted a test of a long-range cruise missile (possibly identical 
to sea-launched Kalibr-NK) from a mobile launcher, which constituted a violation of the INF 
Treaty, but no further tests of this sort were conducted. It is unclear whether Moscow still 
executes the so-called Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs) from the early 1990s, particularly 
regarding the removal of nuclear weapons from surface ships and submarines, and 
destruction of all artillery nuclear munitions. Ambiguity in this part of nuclear deterrence may 
be politically convenient, but it prevents Russia from exploiting a potential position of strength. 
 
Conclusion: Making nuclear instruments useful 
 
The main problem with nuclear military might, as far as Russia is concerned, is that is 
generates too little tangible political benefits. Having invested so heavily in the modernization 
of its nuclear arsenal, Moscow simply cannot afford to continue these investments without any 
political returns in a situation where its economic power is diminishing, and its conventional 
military capabilities are overstretched. 
 
There are scant opportunities to use Russia’s nuclear status in order to gain influence in the 
area of global non-proliferation. Russian diplomacy played a useful, if only generally 
supportive role in managing the protracted crisis around the Iranian nuclear programme, but 
the resolution of the problem, however tentative, has left it with no further functions to perform. 
Regarding the North Korean nuclear and missile tests, Moscow generally follows the lead from 
Beijing. Fundamentally, Russia’s stance against further cuts of strategic forces is poorly 
compatible with its obligations in the non-proliferation regime, as is its position on the pivotal 
importance of nuclear deterrence for national security. 
 
Perhaps the strongest available option for Russia is a resumption of nuclear testing, which 
would be certain to produce colossal international resonance, and would not amount to a 
violation of legally binding treaty obligations. Besides propelling nuclear problems to the top 
of global agenda, such a move would also serve a technical need, since the Soviet-era 
warheads have remained untested for a long time. Infrastructure at the Novaya Zemlya test 
site is undergoing repairs. Another option could be a high-altitude nuclear test, perhaps of a 
small yield, which would not constitute a formal breach of the Outer Space Treaty (1967) but 
would add a new capability to the Russian anti-satellite programme. 
 
Formal withdrawal from nuclear arms control agreements, such as the INF or the New Start 
treaties, would hardly answer Russia’s security interests, because it is crucially important to 
preserve limitations on the US forces in the run-up to their extensive modernization in the next 
decade. What could be seen in Moscow as a useful option is disclosure of some information 
on non-strategic nuclear weapons, for instance warheads for short-range missiles, and a 
propaganda spin on the training of troops for handling of such weapon systems as well as for 
operations on a nuclear battlefield. Such partial removal of a new category of nuclear weapons 
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from the “black box” of secrecy and idleness where they have remained for decades, would 
be certain to make a strong impression on their European neighbours. 
 
In the most general terms, the deeper Russia sinks into the mire of economic stagnation, 
which erodes the foundation of its state power, the greater becomes the need to rely on 
nuclear weapons, which constitute a major unused reserve for power politics. Russia’s decline 
will not be a smooth process, but is certain to involve spasms of political instability, and the 
ruling regime seeks to pre-empt and manage such challenges by the means of “patriotic” 
mobilization. The present leadership has little fear of the risks associated with the manipulation 
of nuclear instruments, but instead has an inflated impression of the political impact to be 




Russian Military Economy 
 
Julian Cooper (University of Birmingham and SIPRI) 
 
 
Assessment of the economic dimension of Russia's military power is concerned above all with 
the country's defence industry and its ability to develop and manufactures armaments for the 
domestic armed forces and for export; the institutions and procedures for the acquisition of 
new weapon systems by the military; and the scale and structure of the state's military 
expenditure.  Appropriate measures include the scale of the defence industry in terms of its 
facilities, employment, R&D potential, the volume of its output, the scale of military expenditure 
in terms of its total volume, share of gross domestic product, and structure. Where relevant, 
comparison with other countries can provide an indicator of relative power.  
 
When considering the power of Russia's military economy, account has to be taken of the fact 
that many of its features, activities and metrics are covered by the country's comprehensive 
law on the state secret, placing limits on the availability and reliability of relevant data. The 
principal sources used here are the author's numerous publications on Russia's military 
economy and data of SIPRI and other defence-related centres of analysis. 
 
The defence industry 
 
In terms of employment and the range of weapons systems and other military equipment it 
produces, the Russian defence industry is one of the largest in the world, second only to the 
USA and probably still larger than that of China. It is able to develop and manufacture all 
categories of armament, from nuclear weapons to small arms. As with the USA and China, it 
also exhibits a marked degree of self-reliance, currently being enhanced further in response 
to sanctions imposed by NATO and European Union member countries following Russia 
actions in Ukraine in 2014.  
 
Approximately two-thirds of the vast Soviet defence industry in terms of output and facilities 
were located on Russian territory and the present day industry, much reduced in scale, is 
based on that inheritance. Whereas in late Soviet times Russia's defence industry employed 
approximately six million people and accounted for some 12 per cent of total industrial output, 
today it has a workforce of about two million and is responsible for 5-6 per cent of the output 
of industry.  
 
The nuclear weapons industry 
 
The core of the defence industry is overseen by the Ministry of Trade and Industry, though 
managed by separate state controlled entities. One exception is the self-contained nuclear 
weapons industry, overseen by the state corporation 'Rosatom'. Nuclear devices are 
developed and produced by 18 enterprises of its directorate for the nuclear weapons complex, 
seven located in closed cities, a long-standing feature of the nuclear industry, with very high 
security and strict controls over access. There are three more such cities with facilities 
producing nuclear materials. The ten closed cities of 'Rosatom' have a total population of 
734,000. 
 
Facilities and employment 
 
The official register of defence industrial-complex organisations as of June 2014 listed 1,341 
industrial enterprises, R&D establishments and other organisations, of which almost 970 were 
in sectors generally considered to represent the defence industry as such in definitional terms, 
excluding the nuclear industry. These core facilities employ 1.3 million at industrial enterprises 
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and approximately 700,000 at research institutes, design bureaux and other organisation 
involved in R&D.  
 
The largest single sector, and one of the most capable, is the aviation industry, with almost a 
fifth of the total number of organisations, followed by the radio industry, the products of which 
include air-space defence systems, another Russian strength. The smaller missile-space 
industry also has considerable capability in the building of strategic nuclear missiles.   
 
Large corporations predominate 
 
The Russian defence industry is now to a large extent dominated by a set of very large state-
owned holding companies, plus two state corporations, the diversified 'Rostekh' and the newly 
formed 'Roskosmos' , responsible for strategic missiles and space technology. In this respect 
it is not unlike the Chinese defence industry. Much of the shipbuilding industry, including 
almost all its naval work, is under the 'United shipbuilding corporation', employing more than 
80,000. The building of fixed-wing aircraft is carried out under the aegis of the  'United aviation 
corporation' (98,800), helicopters 'Vertolety Rossii' (42,000) and aero-engines 'United aero-
engine building corporation ' (80,000), both by 'Rostekh', and aviation missiles are produced 
by 'Takticheskoe raketnoe vooruzhenie' (44,000). Most air-defence systems are developed 
and built by the 'Almaz'- 'Antei' corporation (98,000).  The manufacture of equipment for the 
ground forces is less concentrated, but a significant role is played by the 'Uralvagonzavod' 
corporation (31,000), Russia' sole builder of tanks, plus much other armoured equipment and 
the country's  largest producer of rail wagons. The 'Rostekh' state corporation dates from 2008, 
has a total employment of over 440,000, and includes leading companies in electronics, radio 
and communications, and optical equipment.  
 
The production base and labour 
 
In Soviet times the industrial base of the defence sector was relatively advanced, equipped 
with modern machine tools, often imported notwithstanding the strict regime (COCOM) limiting 
access to Western military-related technologies. During the 1990s and most of the 2000s the 
defence industry was starved of investment and its production equipment became increasingly 
aged and worn. Since 2010 the rate of investment has increased sharply and many enterprises 
have been undergoing modernisation, especially those playing a significant role in the 
implementation, since the beginning of 2011, of Russia's ambitions state armament 
programme to 2020. Similar processes have been at work with respect to the labour force. 
During the first fifteen years or more after the collapse of the USSR it contracted rapidly and 
very few new workers were hired.  Rates of pay were unusually high in Soviet times. The 
average age of personnel grew steadily. During the last ten years these trends have been 
reversed. The labour force has stabilised in scale, rates of pay have risen appreciably, new 
shop floor, engineering and managerial personnel have been taken on and once again the 
defence industry is regarded as a relatively attractive sphere of employment.  With new 
equipment and skills the industry is undoubtedly much more capable than it was only a decade 
ago. 
 
Low labour productivity 
 
However, there is still a long way to go. A striking feature of the Russian defence industry 
when compared with its equivalents in the USA and Western Europe is the very low level of 
labour productivity. Firms tend to be labour-intensive with a relatively low degree of 
specialisation, to a large extent because sub-contracting is still under-developed, a legacy of 
Soviet times. So in 2014, sales per worker in the aeroplane building company 'OAK' ($77,550) 
were less than 15 per cent of the level of 'Boeing' ($548,400), and 21 per cent the level of BAE 
Systems. Taking 'Rostekh' as a whole, its sales per worker in 2014 were $56,520 which is 
only 15 per cent of the level of the Italian company 'Finmeccanica' (now known as 'Leonardo'), 
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a diversified group which to some extent resembles it. One of the best Russian companies by 
this indicator is 'Vertolety Rossii', a successful producer and exporter of helicopters, with a 
figure of $102,225, but this was still one-fifth the production level of 'Boeing'. Notwithstanding 
considerable progress in recent years, the Russian defence industry has still a long way to go 
before it becomes truly competitive.  
 
R&D and Civilian Activity 
 
Just as in Soviet times, the Russian defence industry today undertakes a very substantial 
share of industrial R&D, and employs over half of all the country's scientists. It also plays a 
significant role in the development and manufacture of civilian high-technology goods, again, 
as earlier. The share of civilian production in the total output of the defence industry has fallen 
in recent years as enterprises have focused on work for the domestic armed forces and 
exports; in 2014 it was 21 per cent compared with almost 34 per cent three years earlier. After 




Russia is the second largest arms exporter in the world. However, it is not always understood 
that Russia's own data on 'military-technical cooperation' tends to lead to an overstatement of 
volume, as does SIPRI's methodology.  As acknowledged by the Federal Service for Military-
Technical Cooperation (FS VTS), its annual total volume of sales includes not only end-
product military hardware, but also systems, components, repairs, military services, including 
training, and space launches undertaken for some foreign customers. So, according to FS 
VTS data, in 2014 Russian arms exports were $15.5 billion and in 2015 $14.5 bn. The Centre 
of Analysis of the World Arms Trade in Moscow attempts to present a figure for arms exports 
not only for Russia, but all other countries, in current US dollar terms. In the author's view its 
data are dependable. In 2015 Russia exported arms to a value of $13.9 billion, compared with 
the USA $41.5 bn., France $7.9 bn., Germany, $5.4bn., the UK,$2.8 bn. and China $2.5bn.  
 
Russia arms exports are focused on combat aircraft, helicopters, air defence systems, some 
naval equipment, tanks and armoured vehicles. Russia does not sell many arms to industrially 
developed countries or ones with close relations to the USA or other NATO member countries. 
There is a marked orientation to Asian customers, in particular India and China. The pattern 
of exports reflects the fact that Russia exports proven weapon systems, not of the very latest 
technology, and priced competitively, compared with US or major European equivalents. Arms 
imports are modest, although they have increased to some extent in recent years, totalling 
$100 million in 2010 rising to $328 million in 2014, underlining the commitment to self-reliance 




In absolute terms, Russia ranks in the group of top five countries of the world by volume of 
military spending, and in the top ten by share of that expenditure in gross domestic product 
(GDP).  In terms of current US dollars (an indicator subject to exchange rate fluctuations), in 
2015 according to SIPRI data Russia spent a total of $66.4 billion (but $84.7 bn. in 2014 when 
the rouble was stronger) compared with the USA $596.0 bn., China $214.8 bn.,  Saudi Arabia 
$87.2 bn., UK $55.5 bn., and France $50.9 bn.. Most major countries of the world had a lower 
GDP share of military expenditure in 2015 compared with 2005, but Russia was an exception, 
the share rising from 3.6 to 5.4 per cent, a change driven almost entirely by a large volume of 
spending under the state armament programme to 2020. Compare this to USA, 3.8 and 3.3 
per cent, China an estimated 2.0 and 1.9 per cent, France constant at 2.4 per cent, and the 




By GDP share, Russia's large 5.4 per cent in 2015 (the same as Israel) was exceeded by five 
countries. Note that Rosstat is in the process of changing its GDP data, giving a 2015 share 
of 5.0 per cent and a 2016 budget share of 4.7 per cent. However, Russia's share in 2015 was 
almost certainly a peak and the signs are that it will fall back to nearer 4 per cent over the next 
two to three years. This will of course be a much more modest share than the USSR's, 
estimated at 13 to 14 per cent in the mid-1980s. In spending on the MOD's forces, 
procurement accounted for 44 per cent of the total in 2015 and R&D 10 per cent. The very 
high procurement share is likely to moderate soon, as Russia's drive to modernise the stock 
of equipment of the forces to remedy a famine of almost twenty years, reaches the point that 




After almost two decades of neglect of the military economy, Russia once again has a strong 
defence industry, is a major arms exporter and is back as one of the world's leading countries 
in annual spending on defence.  It has been a central goal of the Putin presidency to restore 
Russia's military capability to a level considered adequate to ensure the country's security, 
even though the achievement of the goal has placed a burden on the economy. To a large 
extent the goal has been fulfilled. In itself this does not present any threat to the EU or NATO: 




Russian Economic Power 
 
Richard Connolly (University of Birmingham and Chatham House) 
 
 
Any analysis of Russian economic power reveals a series of paradoxes that are evident across 
other dimensions of Russian power. During this short section, several of these paradoxes - 
although by no means all - are highlighted to illustrate how Russia possesses a number of 
sources of considerable economic strength, while at the same time displays a range of 
weaknesses that threaten Russia’s long term social, economic and political vitality.  
 
Size of economy 
 
The recent and ongoing recession in Russia has led many to suggest that Russia is an ailing 
economic power. The average rate of annual GDP growth over the last five years (i.e. 2011-
2015) is just 1.2%. Moreover, the depreciation of the rouble has caused the dollar value of 
Russia’s GDP to shrink by over 40% between 2013 and 2015. At $1.3 trillion, the Russian 
economy is the 13th largest in the world in dollar terms (roughly level with Australia and just 
ahead of Spain), accounting for just 1.8% of world GDP. And in dollar terms, Russia’s per 
capita income is $9,000, just 16% of US per capita income, and 28% of the EU average, 
placing Russia behind Mauritius and just ahead of Mexico.  
 
But this misses some important developments. Measured at purchasing power parity, Russia’s 
GDP was, despite the recession, $3.4 trillion in 2015, making Russia the 6th largest economy 
in the world.  Measured at PPP, per capita income is nearly $25,000, 44% of the US level and 




Natural resources account for the vast majority of Russian exports, as well as making a huge 
contribution to domestic tax revenues and GDP. In this respect, Russia remains as dependent 
on natural resources as the Soviet Union once was, with its economic and geopolitical fortunes 
heavily influenced by movements in global natural resource prices (Bradshaw and Connolly, 
2016). Oil and oil products account for the largest share of export revenues, while natural gas 
is the second most important source of export revenue, although revenues have plateaued 
since the global recession of 2009, which was caused by slowing demand from Russia’s 
principal gas customers in the European Union (EU). Coal is also an important component of 
Russian natural resource exports, accounting 2.7% of total exports.  
 
Taken together, hydrocarbons dominate Russia’s export profile, accounting for anywhere 
between 55-75% of total Russian exports in any one year. However, other natural resources 
have proven to be an important source of export revenues. Non-hydrocarbon natural 
resources, such as metals, minerals and forestry products, account for around 8-9% of total 
Russian exports.  
 
Despite the important role that natural resources play in Russia’s economy, Russia is a price 
taker, not a price maker, on global natural resource markets. As illustrated in Table 1, Russia’s 
share of global export markets for most natural resources, while significant, is not so high as 
to confer exceptional marker power to Russian companies. This disparity between Russia’s 
dependence on natural resource exports and its relatively small degree of market power 
reveals the crucial paradox of Russian economic power: Russia relies to an exceptionally large 
degree on the extraction and sale of range of goods over which it exerts very little in the way 





Table 1. Russian share of selected global natural resource exports, 2014 (% of recorded 
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Source: UN Comtrade, 2016 
 
It is difficult to overstate the importance of natural resource exports to the functioning of the 
Russian economy. Those estimates that seek to estimate the importance of resource 
revenues to GDP growth tend to focus on oil and gas alone, and measure the direct value-
added share of the oil and gas sectors in aggregate GDP. These estimates suggest that the 
oil and gas sectors alone account for anywhere between 10-25% of GDP. If we assume that 
other natural resources would add an additional 10% of this figure, then total resource 
revenues might account for somewhere between 12.5-27.5% of Russian GDP.  
 
This, however, does not tell the whole story. As well as the direct contribution of the natural 
resource sectors to Russian GDP, it is also necessary to take their indirect contribution into 
account. This includes incorporating the way in which resource rents are shared throughout 
the Russian economy via an informal rent sharing mechanism, which includes price subsidies, 
informal taxes, and excess costs.  
 
As a result, the unhealthy dependence of Russia on natural resource export revenues leaves 
Russia vulnerable to actions beyond its immediate control. The fact that the last three periods 
of economic distress have been preceded by downturns in natural resource prices offers a 




Russia’s proficiency as a producer of technology also reveals the uneven nature of Russian 
economic power. While high-technology exports account for less than 3% of Russia’s total 
exports, there are several areas in which the country is a world leader. For instance, Russia 
is one of the leading powers in the sphere of nuclear energy. Elsewhere, the software industry 
has grown rapidly in recent years, with exports from the sector growing faster than in all the 
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other high-tech sectors, at an average annual rate of around 28 percent between 2003 and 
2014. By 2015, software was Russia’s second largest source of knowledge-intensive exports.   
 
The fact that Russia is not a leading power across most other technology-intensive areas of 
economic activity has led to the view that Russia is an economy in which only natural 
resources are important. This, however, ignores the fact that Russia continues to be an 
important manufacturer by global standards. In 2013, Russia was the 8th largest manufacturer 
in the world. Russia remains one of the world’s largest manufacturers with a broad array of 
manufactured goods produced in the country. However, this is in some respects a weakness 
for Russia: a large proportion of Russian manufacturing is not competitive on global markets, 
is consumed only within Russia’s borders, with production highly correlated with performance 
in the natural resources sector. This is because natural resource export revenues are 
transferred across the economy to maintain output and employment in manufacturing (and 
other) sectors.  
 
One area where Russia is a leading global economic power is in the production and exports 
of armaments. After over five years of a concerted effort to modernize Russia’s armed forces, 
the volume and sophistication of the new equipment delivered to the Russian armed forces 
since 2011 is impressive. Apart from the United States, no other country is able to produce 
such a wide array of weapon systems— ranging from ICBMs and nuclear-powered attack 
submarines to corvettes and APCs — using largely indigenous and therefore sovereign 
capabilities. Russia is also the world’ s second largest exporter of armaments, recording well 
over $15 billion worth of arms exports in 2015. This position as a leading armaments exporter 
gives Russia considerable political influence in those countries where it is an important source 
of weapons deliveries.  
 
Despite Russia’s strengths in the sphere of armaments production, the deficiencies evident 
across the wider range of civilian technology are likely to serve as a source of economic 
weakness in the future. Economic development – often labelled as modernization and 
diversification - at home will be shaped much more by rising levels of technology of investment 
and production across the civilian economy, than by any niche areas of comparative 
advantage in the military sphere, contrary to hopes expressed by Vladimir Putin that the 




Russia’s population has always been viewed as both a source of, and constraint on, its 
economic power. In the early twentieth century, a large, rapidly growing but poor population 
was seen as both a threat to smaller European countries, and also as a weakness. After all, a 
large and poor population, mainly located in the countryside, was viewed as the principal 
barrier to socio-economic modernization. Today, Russia faces different problems. The 
population has shrunk by over 5 million since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, falling 
from 150 million to little over 144 million in 2016. This population is also ageing rapidly, with 
the dependency ratio – i.e. the proportion of the population supported by the working age 
population – forecast to rise to among the highest levels in the world. Indeed, the Russian 
labour force has been shrinking since 2010. This is likely to weigh heavily on public finances 
in the years to come.  
 
Nevertheless, Russia retains formidable strengths in the human sphere, despite the negative 
demographic trajectories described above. First, while the population is likely to shrink over 
the next decade, it remains the 9th most populous country in the world. Second, of those 
countries in the ten most populous countries in the world, Russia has the second highest level 
of per capita income (only the USA has a higher income level), and the second highest score 
on the UN’s Human Development Index. In this respect, Russia is one of a few populous yet 
developed economies. Third, while Russia is often cited as a source of out-migration (the so-
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called ‘brain drain’), it is often overlooked that Russia has for the past fifteen years been a net 
recipient of migration, i.e. more migrants have moved to Russia than have left the country. 
Millions of migrants have moved from former Soviet states, such as Armenia, Moldova, 
Tajikistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan, to Russia. Many of these migrants remit a large share of 
their incomes back to their home countries, increasing Russia’s economic influence over the 




This short section has highlighted the continued pertinence of Chancellor Bismarck’s famous 
observation that “Russia is never as strong as she looks, nor as weak”. What held true in the 
late 19th century is as true today, especially when looking at the economic dimension of power. 
If the concerned observer focuses on certain aspects of Russia’s technological deficiencies, 
demographic profile and relative low income levels, they will be convinced of Russia’s 
weakness and inevitable decline. If, however, the observer shifts attention to Russia’s huge 
natural resource endowment, its full-spectrum range of military production capabilities, and its 
ability to engage in cyber warfare, that observer may be persuaded that Russia will remain an 
important and formidable actor on the global stage. The truth, of course, lies somewhere 
between these binary views of Russian economic capabilities. Instead of seeing Russia as 
strong or weak, or destined for decline, or re-emergence on the global stage, we should 
instead recognize that Russia possesses strengths and weaknesses in equal measure. 
Dealing successfully with Russia will require an approach that takes both aspects of Russian 
economic power into consideration.  
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Russia’s Energy Power 
 
Tracey German (King’s College London) 
 
 
A popular image of Russia, prevalent across Europe, is of an energy superpower, a resurgent 
bear that wields energy as a weapon to coerce its neighbours and restore Russian influence 
across the globe. Most recently, energy has been categorised as one of the tools of Russia’s 
so-called ‘hybrid warfare’.14 However, like all typecasts, the reality is far more nuanced. There 
is little doubt that energy is both a vital constituent and instrument of Russian national power, 
and that hydrocarbon exports have become a major tool of Russia's foreign policy. The 2003 
Energy Strategy formally stated that Russia's natural resources should be a fundamental 
element of Moscow's diplomacy, noting that ‘Russia has considerable energy resources and 
a powerful fuel and energy complex, which is the basis of economic development, an 
instrument of domestic and foreign policy. The role of the country in world energy markets 
determines its geopolitical influence in many ways.’15 This was reinforced in the 2009 National 
Security Strategy (NSS) which stated that changes in the international system ‘together with 
Russia's resource potential and pragmatic policy for its use, have broadened the possibilities 
for the Russian Federation to reinforce its influence on the world stage’.16  
 
This paper explores the role of energy in Russia’s national power, both in terms of its key 
contribution to Russian capabilities and as a lever that can be used to exert influence. It 
concentrates on Russia’s hydrocarbon reserves, as well as its energy transit infrastructure, 
and how these resources contribute to different elements of the country’s national power. The 
term ‘energy’ is very broad and frequently misused, particularly as a synonym for oil and gas. 
It is important to note that it does not just refer to fossil fuels (oil, natural gas and coal); it also 
covers electricity generation (including nuclear and renewables), transmission and 
distribution, as well as transnational power grids. As countries have become increasingly 
reliant upon imports rather than indigenous resources, energy security, particularly the 
challenge of transporting resources to global markets, has emerged as an issue of great 
importance.17 Security of supply impacts on the wider concept of state security and supply 
disruption can seriously undermine a country’s economy, as there is a fundamental need for 
energy to fuel economic growth. Thus, energy security is no longer exclusively an issue of 
economic concern; it has become a question of national security and strategy, increasing the 
power and influence of countries like Russia which have vast reserves and expertise.  
 
Russia’s natural resources, particularly its hydrocarbon reserves, constitute a key pillar of the 
country’s economy and are a material resource that contributes to state power. According to 
one definition, national power can be understood at three levels: (1) resources or capabilities, 
or power in-being; (2) how that power is converted through national processes; (3) and power 
in outcomes.18 This understanding of power views states as ‘capability containers’, which need 
to convert material resources into instruments of power, such as combat proficiency, and 
hence into successful outcomes. Thus power is not just about capabilities (for example, 
military strength, resources or economic production), but the ability to convert those 
capabilities into successful outcomes. Natural resources in themselves do not contribute to 
                                                          
14 For example, see Oscar Jonsson and Robert Seely, ‘Russian Full-Spectrum Conflict: an Appraisal 
after Ukraine’, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 28(1) (March 2015): 1-22. 
15 Energeticheskaya strategiya Rossii na period do 2020 goda. Utverzhdena rasporyazheniem 
Pravitelstva Rossiiskoi Federatsii No 1234-p ot 28 avgusta 2003, p. 1. 
16 Paragraph 9, Russian National Security Strategy. 
17 For further analysis of the issue of energy security see Daniel Yergin, ‘Ensuring Energy Security’, 
Foreign Affairs, 85(2) (March/April 2006): 69-82. 




national power: a country needs to be able to convert its material resources into capabilities 
and outcomes. Accepting this view that power is not just capabilities, both tangible and 
intangible, but also the ability to convert those capabilities into successful outcomes, it could 
be argued that Russia has become far more powerful under Putin’s leadership: the Kremlin 
has a range of capabilities at its disposal, including its natural resources, and has been able 
to convert these capabilities into successful outcomes in a range of situations. One of the key 
drivers behind this is Russia’s energy sector, notably oil and natural gas.   
 
The world’s largest producer of natural gas and second only to Saudi Arabia in terms of oil 
production, Russia has an abundance of hydrocarbon resources on its territory: its proven 
reserves of oil at the end of 2015 stood at 102.4 billion barrels of oil, constituting 6 per cent of 
the global total, while its output of oil reached record post-Soviet levels, hitting an average of 
10.98m barrels per day, over 12 per cent of total global output.19 However, it is natural gas 
rather than oil which is much more significant for Russia, both in terms of economy and 
influence. The country has the world’s second largest proven reserves of natural gas (having 
ceded top spot to Iran in 2015), with 32.3 trillion cubic metres, over 17 per cent of the global 
total, and production in 2015 totalled 573.3 billion cubic metres.20 Furthermore, Russia 
supplies 25 per cent of the gas used by the European Union (EU) and accounts for 40 per 
cent of the gas that the EU imports, a figure that is only going to increase as indigenous 
reserves decline. However, as mentioned above, resources do not necessarily translate 
automatically into national power; Russia needs to convert its abundance of oil and natural 
gas into a source of national power.  
 
Gas and oil have constituted the principal foundation of the Russian (and formerly Soviet) 
economy for decades. Whilst the proportion of the country’s GDP derived from hydrocarbon 
production is less than 27 per cent (14.5 per cent from the export of hydrocarbons), the 
economy is much more dependent upon oil and gas than these figures suggest. Energy 
accounts for about half of Russian export earnings and has played a central role in the revival 
of Russia’s economic fortunes after the 1990s.21 Vladimir Putin’s arrival in the Kremlin was 
accompanied by a sustained rise in the price of oil, which has bolstered the Russian economy 
and also its ability to spend on a range of areas, notably defence. Revenues from the export 
of oil and gas jumped from US$53bn in 2000 to US$330bn in 2014 (although this has dropped 
with the subsequent fall in oil prices). The increase in energy revenues has been crucial for 
securing notable growth in the Russian economy, which has supported high levels of defence 
expenditure. As the country’s capabilities caught up with its ambitions, Russia increasingly 
sought to exert its growing power outside of its borders. Oil and gas have played a central role 
as enablers and instruments of Russian national power during Putin’s time in office, reflecting 
his long-running interest in Russia’s natural resources.22 It is little coincidence that with oil (and 
gas) prices remaining relatively high during his years in the Kremlin, Putin has also presided 
over Russia’s return to the international stage as a strong state capable of exerting global 
influence. 
 
However, Russia’s rich base of natural resources is a mixed blessing.  Whilst economic growth 
is driven largely by inflows from resource exports and the oil industry, in particular, has been 
                                                          
19 BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2013. Available at: 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/res/commod/pdf/ppt/BP0613.pdf, accessed 30.01.2017. The rise in 
output levels was partly because the devaluation of the rouble made production more affordable, but 
was also a deliberate defiance of OPEC’s demand for all producers to cut supply.  
20 BP Statistical Review of World Energy, pp. 20-22. 
21 For further details see Andrey Movchan, ‘Just an Oil Company? The True Extent of Russia’s 
Dependency on Oil and Gas’, Carnegie.ru Commentary, 14 September 2015. Available at: 
http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/09/14/just-oil-company-true-extent-of-russia-s-dependency-on-oil-
and-gas/ihtg, accessed 3.08.2016. 
22 Towards the end of the 1990s, he reportedly wrote his PhD thesis on the role of strategic mineral 
resources in the development of Russia’s economy at the St Petersburg Mining Institute. 
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a crucial factor in the country's recovery from the August 1998 financial crisis, the economy is 
heavily reliant on export earnings from its vast hydrocarbon reserves, making it vulnerable to 
commodity price shocks. Any significant fall in oil prices has a negative impact on economic 
growth: it is estimated that Russia loses around US$2 billion in revenue for every dollar drop 
in the oil price.  
 
There are some significant differences in terms of how each commodity contributes to national 
power. Oil is much more significant in terms of raising revenue for the national budget: in 2014, 
it generated approximately 88 per cent of the federal budget’s hydrocarbon revenues and 
accounted for 82 per cent of hydrocarbon export revenues.23 Natural gas is more important as 
an instrument of influence. Ghaled argues that ‘Russia’s status as a world power cannot be 
achieved without the use of oil to increase Russia’s national wealth, and without the use of 
natural gas to promote Russia’s national interests in a well-defined sphere of influence’.24 Gas 
is more potent than oil because of the nature of the market and differences in the flexibility of 
transporting the two to international markets: oil is much more transportable, and the global 
oil market is complex and fragmented, inhibiting any manipulation attempts by individual 
suppliers. By contrast natural gas requires a fixed supply infrastructure, either static pipelines 
or liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals, both of which require extensive capital outlays prior 
to the exploitation of any reserves, as well as long-term contracts. This makes it very difficult 
for consumers (principally states) to switch suppliers and endows producers with considerable 
influence, as feasible alternatives are lacking. 
 
Pipeline networks also provide Moscow with a source of influence over other oil- and gas-
producing states across the post-Soviet space. During the Soviet era, the routing of pipeline 
infrastructure was not a prominent issue: pipelines were constructed to serve the needs of the 
Union, and thus, republics such as Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan were part of the national 
network, which generally flowed towards western Russia and Moscow. Until a decade ago, 
countries in the region were entirely reliant upon the Russian network of pipelines to reach 
European consumers, undermining their political and economic autonomy and giving Moscow 
substantial leverage. Consequently there has been considerable investment in new 
international export pipelines that bypass Russian territory (such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 
oil link), leading to the development of a southern oil and gas corridor between the Caspian 
and Mediterranean Seas. 
 
Western assessments of Russia’s ‘energy’ power tend to be bleak and Moscow has frequently 
been accused of using its resources to gain diplomatic leverage. It has certainly exploited its 
dominance of natural gas supply to coerce post-Soviet states over the past decade: Georgia, 
Ukraine and Belarus have all felt the impact of a reliance on Russian gas imports, through 
shut-offs and increased prices. Natural gas is a much more effective instrument of coercion 
than oil, largely because of the fixed nature of the transit infrastructure discussed above. While 
gas is often used as a stick, gas imports are also sometimes used as a carrot, with lower 
prices being offered in return for compliance with other Russian demands. However, it is very 
difficult to wield the energy weapon to good effect. Russia’s reputation both as a supplier of 
energy and as an international partner has been tarnished as a result of its apparent 
willingness to use its energy resources and control over export infrastructure as an instrument 
of political influence. Concern over Russian motives and its already considerable influence 
over European energy supplies prompted renewed interest in the development of new pipeline 
infrastructure (and LNG terminals), enabling countries in Europe to diversify their suppliers. 
Lithuania’s offshore LNG terminal at Klaipeda means that the country is no longer reliant on 
                                                          
23 See US Energy Information Administration, www.eia.gov.  
24 Alexander Ghaleb, ‘Natural Gas an Instrument of State Power’, The Letort Papers, Strategic 
Studies Institute (October 2011), p. 44. 
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Russian gas imports and has been described as an ‘energy-security guarantor’ for the entire 
Baltic region.25  
 
As mentioned above, resources in themselves do not contribute to national power: a country 
needs to be able to convert its material resources into capabilities and outcomes. Thus there 
is a mutual dependence between Russia and Europe in terms of energy. Despite concern 
about Russia’s apparent willingness to use its energy resources as a political weapon, it 
should not be forgotten that it needs European markets as much as Europe needs Russian oil 
and gas. Within this symbiotic relationship, Europe has an increasing need for Russia’s oil and 
gas, as its indigenous supplies continue to decline, whilst Russia needs markets for its 
hydrocarbons and the revenues these exports generate in order to be able to fund future field 
development and transport infrastructure such as pipelines and LNG terminals: in 2014, more 
than 70 per cent of Russia's exports of crude oil and almost 90 per cent of its natural gas 
exports went to European countries. Whilst Asia represents a large potential market in the 
long-term, the pipeline infrastructure is not yet in place. Capturing this market ultimately 
depends upon maintaining steady supplies of oil and gas to European markets. Wielding 
energy as a weapon against European states will ultimately be self-defeating for Moscow. 
 
Whilst Russia’s hydrocarbon reserves and export infrastructure constitute a long-established 
lever of national influence, an emerging and overlooked element of Russian ‘energy power’ is 
its nuclear power diplomacy. Over the past five years, state nuclear energy company 
Rosatom26 has signed agreements with approximately 30 countries, increasing its presence 
across the globe, including South and North America, Europe, the Middle East and Asia. It 
already operates in 40 countries and has an order book for the next decade worth over 
US$101bn, including a number of ‘build-own-operate’ contracts, which necessitate a long-term 
Russian presence. There is growing concern that Moscow is using its dominance in the nuclear 
energy industry for geopolitical reasons to expand its sphere of influence. 
 
Russia’s abundance of oil and natural gas is a mixed blessing, as is its position as one of the 
world’s largest exporters of both. Whilst its hydrocarbon reserves constitute a key pillar of the 
country’s economy and are a material resource that contributes to state power, the economy’s 
over-reliance on oil and gas receipts represents a critical vulnerability. The halving of the oil 
price between July and December 2014 undermined the assumptions of the federal budget 
and represents a significant threat to growth and stability in Russia in the medium- to long-
term. Russia’s control of natural gas reserves and export infrastructure to Europe gives it 
enormous leverage, but its customers are increasingly wary of its ambitions and have been 
seeking to diversify their supplies.  
 
A key challenge for Western policy-makers is to maintain unity of purpose: it has been clear 
to Moscow for some time that there was a lack of unity within European organisations and that 
member-states give priority to the development of bilateral relations over a coherent European 
foreign policy position. This was demonstrated at the end of 2015 when five European 
companies (BASF, E.ON, ENGIE, OMV and Shell) signed a deal with Gazprom to add two 
additional lines to the Nord Stream gas pipeline, which links Russia to Germany under the 
Baltic Sea. The deal prompted a storm of protest from governments across Central and 
Eastern Europe who argued that Germany will benefit from the deal at the expense of other 
member-states and the EU as a whole, undermining European consensus on Russia and 
ultimately increasing Moscow’s influence.  
                                                          
25 Milda Seputyte, ‘Lithuania Grabs LNG in Effort to Curb Russian Dominance’, Bloomberg, 27 
October 2014. Available at: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-10-27/lithuania-grabs-lng-
in-effort-to-curb-russian-dominance, accessed 18.07.2016. 
26 Rosatom is a ‘full-cycle’ company, covering the spectrum of nuclear energy from uranium mining to 
enrichment, NPP construction, power generation, waste management and plant decommissioning. 
For more details see http://www.rosatom.ru/en/. 
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Russia's Soft Power in the Post-Soviet Space 
 
Victoria Hudson (King’s College London) 
 
 
Soft power is the ability of a polity to exercise cultural leadership, advancing its own norms, 
values and worldview so that they becomes attractive, legitimate and credible in the eyes of 
the target audience. The resulting shared outlook aids the achievement of foreign policy goals 
by facilitating cooperation and co-option that may help foster consent and limit resistance in 
relation to particularly controversial policy directions. Thus, as soft power acts on hearts and 
minds, strategically significant shifts in power potential occur on a latent level before they are 
manifested in action, both among elites and the general public.  
 
Russian soft power strategising   
 
Over the past decade, Russia has invested heavily in sectors of public policy relevant to soft 
power. Senior establishment figures start from the assumption that Russia operates under 
conditions increasingly characterised as 'information warfare' (Western attempts to incite 
colour revolutions by undermining Russian public morale, image and self-confidence), or 
'hybrid warfare' (where the psychological challenge undergirds the military component). 
 
Russia views the post-Soviet space as an area of great strategic significance and has been 
frustrated and humiliated by Western integration projects, particularly those involving the Baltic 
and GUAM regions, which are seen to have progressed without due consultation with Russia. 
Moscow is determined to ensure its droit de regard, even at a heavy cost to its economic and 
diplomatic standing, as the ongoing Ukraine crisis has shown. The Eastern Slavic areas - 
particularly Ukraine and Belarus - are of particular import as the perceived cradle of Great 
Russian statehood, without which Moscow's claims to represent a distinct civilisational centre 
of global standing would rest on shaky ground. In Central Asia China is making significant 
economic inroads, though currently with far less cultural ambition. 
 
In the global arena Russian soft power efforts focus predominantly on undermining the pre-
eminence of Western interpretations by using media platforms such as RT and Sputnik (see 
the following section of this report). However, in the countries of the former Soviet Union (FSU) 
there remains greater scope for the projection of forward-focused Russian narratives on 
culture, values and inter-state cooperation – this is due to similarity in political context and 
lingering economic integration. In both contexts one should note the significance of Russia's 
soft power standing for the domestic audience: perceived success casts a warm affirmative 
glow over Russian self-identity as leading power in the region, thereby bolstering the regime, 
while a perception of failure raises doubts about this pre-eminence, which could provoke 
political challenges to the Kremlin within Russia. 
 
Russian soft power strategy is embodied in official documentation across the foreign, cultural, 
information, defence and educational policy domains, and must be seen as an integral 
component of the Kremlin's broader intention to reposition post-Soviet Russia as a regional 
hegemon and recognised global great power. Such a dignified role demands that Russia 
shake off the image of a mere supplier of hydrocarbons and raw materials, and re-emerge as 
a competitive agent on the international marketplace of ideas.  
 
Russian soft power seeks to re-shape international norms and values in ways that are 
conducive to the pursuit of Russian interests (e.g. re-interpretation of human rights and issues 
of state sovereignty). As well as casting Russia as a valuable international player, this should 
foster an aura of legitimacy and credibility around Russian modes of socio-economic 
development (e.g. so-called sovereign democracy and the upholding of cultural identities, 
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spirituality and traditional social mores), particularly by questioning the motivation and 




Cultural attraction confers a wide range of legitimately desirable socio-economic advantages 
on the state in question. Yet Russia's strategising exceeds the norm in the extent of its 
ambition. 
 
- Russian and Russian-speaking communities in the FSU are seen to offer grounds for 
Russian intervention, ranging from diplomatic statements aiming to embarrass the EU with 
regard to minority rights in its member states, to, as President Putin has publicly declared, 
potentially providing 'politically plausible' grounds for material intervention in defence of those 
rights at strategically opportune moments. Such 'compatriots' are thus a primary target of 
government policy, with an estimated 17 million across the region, with particular 
concentrations in Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and the Baltic States.  
 
- Soft power overtures aim to counter geopolitical shifts in favour of the West by socialising 
elites and populations in ways that render them more open to Russia's political projects, (e.g. 
Eurasian Economic Union), or garner support for Kremlin positions in international 
organisations. 
 
- The cultivation of pro-Russia sentiment (understood as 'loyalty') should encourage lobbying 
for Russian political and economic interests within the host country by well-placed compatriots. 
 
- Among the post-Soviet generation the Russian language has, to varying degrees, been 
deprioritised in favour of the national language or English. Russian policy seeks to restore the 
language as lingua franca in the region, seeing it as a significant factor of cultural and political 
influence, not to mention an indicator of prestige.  
 
Capabilities and infrastructure 
 
Cultural centres and foundations 
 
Since ‘grey cardinal’ Vladislav Surkov declared the need to 'recover the conquering charm of 
Russian culture' in 2006, numerous channels of public diplomacy have emerged. Among the 
better funded and most relevant for the post-Soviet region are Rossotrudnichestvo (the 
‘Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad, 
and International Humanitarian Cooperation’; $95.5m of funding), the Russkiy Mir Foundation 
(Russian World; $15m), and the Gorcharkov Foundation for Public Diplomacy ($2m). Alhough 
their emphases differ somewhat, all three essentially aim to promote Russia's culture, 
language, image and worldview abroad, whilst cultivating relationships that may result in some 
useful 'service' to Russia, whether that be lobbying, business investment or reproducing the 
Russian worldview in politically useful settings. Data suggests there is relatively greater 
potential in the Baltic States, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Moldova in this regard. However, while 
these may constitute useful fora aiding interaction between those already sympathetic to the 
concept of the Russian World, the capacity of these outlets to effectively reach out to, and 
communicate with, the wider population, is limited by perceptions of neo-imperialism and, 
moreover, by the fact that participants are self-selecting and may have other calls on their 
attention. 
 
Grant provision for multiplier effects 
 
Russia seeks to augment the effect of its soft power effort by providing funds for third-party 
organisations to conduct activities in support of Russian culture, language and spirituality 
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abroad. Grant providers include the Russkiy Mir Foundation, which received over 400 
applications for the 2015-2016 cycle, and the 'Orthodox Initiative' of the Russian Orthodox 
Church, which has disbursed 567.5m roubles, mostly since 2010. Likewise the Gorchakov 
Foundation for Public Diplomacy has funded 58 international educational gatherings since 
2012. While meeting a real need for funding among interested parties, such initiatives also 
have potential to strengthen networks among Russians and Russian speakers abroad, and in 
providing a platform for civil society actors, may increase the effectiveness and credibility of 
Russia's soft power work. 
 
Russian higher education 
 
International mobility in the higher education sector is a potent source of soft power, with 3.5 
million people globally crossing international borders for tertiary study in 2013. Russia claimed 
almost 4% (up from c.2% in 2000) of that market, with 138,496 students, of whom 87% were 
from the former Soviet Union. Additionally, there are approaching 60 branches of Russian 
universities elsewhere in the region. As Russia remains the primary destination for students 
from many of the former union republics (with the exception of the Baltic states and Georgia), 
Russian higher education constitutes an important vehicle of socialisation among the new 
generation of leaders in the region. There are ambitions to significantly increase the Russian 
share of this market in the coming years, since it is reasoned that educational services not 
only provide a diversified source of revenue, but also that the experience will motivate highly-
qualified graduates to work in Russia, thereby reversing 'brain drain', and will cultivate 'pro-
Russian' sentiment among participants. To increase the appeal of Russian universities, the 
government set the target of having at least five Russian HEIs in the globally ranked top 100 
by 2020 (http://5top100.com/) and, as of 2015, supported 15,000 full scholarships for 




Russia media outlets are potentially a very significant tool of transborder cultural influence in 
so far as Russian is still widely understood across the region. However, Russian broadcasting 
and press tends to occupy a relatively small section of the respective markets, even among 
ethnic Russians. Rather, as local newsmakers are often under-funded and lack resources to 
carry out first-hand reporting and analysis, they often pick up on stories and cues from better 
resourced Russian news agencies. Likewise, for local entertainment media producers, it 
frequently makes better economic sense to purchase Russian products rather than to invest 
in local programming or purchase more expensive Western equivalents. If local media 
products are made, it is often with a view to their subsequent export to the far larger Russian 
market, and thus reflect the cultural preferences of Russian audiences and buyers. This 
enables the reproduction of Russian cultural values and worldview which underpin political 
perspectives in a broader sense. 
 
Russian Orthodox Church 
 
It remains controversial to what extent the Russian Orthodox Church is directly influenced by 
the Kremlin, particularly in the countries with a higher number of Orthodox believers and 
greater powers of ecclesiastical self-government: i.e. Ukraine, and to a lesser degree the 
Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian Orthodox churches. However, the church retains a high degree 
of societal trust, and is seen as a transnational bearer of civilisational values that may unite 
Russians and Russian speakers abroad. As an institution it is seeking to raise professional 
standards among the clergy and lay members, and become more involved in pastoral service. 
It also tries to work closely with both religious and secular media in the region to amplify voices 





United Russia support to political parties 
 
Russia's ruling party has signed a number of cooperation agreements with political parties 
abroad, including with the "Concord" Social Democratic Party of Latvia, which gained 24/100 
seats in 2014 elections, and the Estonian Centre Party, which has 27/101 seats in the Estonian 
parliament, which are both favoured overwhelmingly by the respective Russian minorities. The 
agreement is said to facilitate channels of communication on issues of education, culture, 
economy, bilateral relations and public administration experience with United Russia. 
 
Probability of success 
 
Russian soft power is currently in a state of transition between old and new ways of thinking, 
both on the part of Russians involved in projecting national culture abroad, and audiences 
whose responses may be variously conditioned by Soviet nostalgia, rejection of anything 
hinting of Russian neo-imperialism or interest in the opportunities that closer cooperation with 
Russia could provide. 
 
Moscow’s approach to soft power implementation has tended to be rather declarative, stating 
broad aims without concrete steps and timelines for their realisation, or involving activities 
conducted without evaluating their effectiveness in achieving stated goals. Indeed, in some 
cases, soft power initiatives have resembled the living out of imperial nostalgia with the 
domestic constituency in mind, and have served rather to alienate the wider public abroad 
(e.g. the cultivation of marginal compatriots groups in Ukraine, even well before the ongoing 
crisis). Further, particularly in the early years, initiatives under the soft power rubric often 
proved to be mere vehicles for the transfer of funds among pre-existing supporters, although 
there is greater movement towards fiscal accountability now. 
 
Success will depend on Russia's capacity to go beyond reliance on Soviet legacies to 
construct a forward-looking basis for 'ties that bind', and to ensure coherent, effective 
implementation by continuing to improve the quality and scope of its soft power resources, 
and building trusting relations. Much Western media attention focuses upon Russian gaffes 
and failures, but this should be seen in the context of an overall, if imperfect, campaign to 
strengthen Russia's informational and cultural influence. Research has shown that Russian 
narratives do resonate among general audiences, although balanced by wariness of Russian 
leadership. The pursuit of Western values is potentially destabilisng for incumbent regimes in 
the region and thus the Russian model is perhaps more likely to have a certain appeal to 
established elites. 
 
Implications and recommendations for policy-makers in the West 
 
It is likely that Russia will become more culturally competitive in the post-Soviet space in the 
coming years. Concretely, Western policy may respond by: 
 
 Monitoring capacity building and audience reception by longitudinal studies in the most 
strategically significant areas; 
 
 Refuting robustly any misinformation or disinformation emanating from Russian 
propaganda sources; 
 
 Continuing to engage students and young elites from the region through HE and 
cultural exchanges and scholarships to next generation of young elites; 
 
 Working with Western production companies to encourage affordable, high quality 




 Inviting Russian public diplomacy practitioners to participate in joint projects to 
enhance cooperation and understanding, and reduce 'othering'; 
 
 Engaging with some of the key ideas of Russian soft power, at least behind the scenes, 
to devise more robust, progressive responses to its more salient critiques.  
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Russia’s Soft Power beyond the Post-Soviet Space 
 
Valentina Feklyunina (Newcastle University, UK) 
 
 
Soft power is an important dimension of Russia’s overall power. Following the onset of the 
crisis in and around Ukraine, and Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Russia’s overt and covert 
influence in and over other international actors has been at the centre of policy debate in the 
‘West’. Russia’s alleged interference in the UK Brexit campaign, and the US presidential 
elections, together with its alleged role in the rise of nationalist and populist sentiments across 
Western countries, have highlighted the growing role of Russian propaganda, and have led to 
the current propaganda panic. 
 
Russia’s soft power can be understood as an ability to project strategic narratives that 
resonate with specific audiences, and that amplify or shape their understandings of the world 
and their political preferences in line with Russia’s foreign policy objectives. While in its 
immediate neighbourhood Russia’s strategic narratives target primarily ethnic Russians and 
Russian speakers, designed to appeal to common cultural and historical legacies (see the 
previous section in this report), Russia’s soft power beyond the post-Soviet space works 
differently.  
 
In order to assess the extent of Russia’s soft power, it is important to consider (i) which 
audiences are particularly sensitive to Russia’s strategic narratives; (ii) which narratives and 
which means of projecting these narratives are used; and (iii) what is the ‘added value’ of 
Russia’s soft power (in other words, to what extent Russia’s soft power amplifies or transforms 
the political preferences of target audiences). The latter question about added value is 
particularly difficult to answer. At the same time, it has become dangerously politicised, with 
numerous Western policy-makers and analysts warning of the exceptional threat from Russian 
propaganda.  
 
How does Russia view soft power? 
 
Russia’s view of soft power, to a significant extent, stems from its experience of witnessing 
the so-called ‘colour revolutions’ in the post-Soviet space, particularly the 2004 Orange 
Revolution in Ukraine. Seeing these revolutions as engineered by Western actors with the 
help of soft power, the Russian authorities understand soft power as a disruptive force that 
works through civil society to undermine a state’s sovereignty. For example, President Putin, 
addressing Russia’s Security Council in July 2014,,warned of attempts by other international 
actors ‘to weaken Russia’, and speculated about their use of ‘modern information and 
communication technologies, [and] channels of dependent, ‘pocket’ NGOs – the mechanisms 
of the so-called soft power’.27 
 
Fearing that it was losing in a soft power competition against the ‘West’, Russia has invested 
significant resources in its own soft power ambitions over the past decade. The important 
place of soft power in Moscow’s arsenal is emphasised in Russia’s most recent Foreign Policy 
Concept that was approved by President Putin on 30 November 2016. This document 
describes soft power as ‘an integral part of efforts to achieve foreign policy objectives’. It also 
specifies that soft power, according to Moscow’s understanding, ‘includes the tools offered by 
civil society, as well as various methods and technologies – from information and 
communication, to humanitarian and other types’. 
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The Foreign Policy Concept further mentions that one of Russia’s main objectives is ‘to bolster 
the standing of Russian mass media and communication tools in the global information space 
and convey Russia’s perspective on international process to a wider international 
community’.28 Thus, we can expect that Russia is likely to intensify its propaganda efforts. The 
ongoing propaganda panic in the ‘West’ is likely to inflate the perception of Russia’s soft power 
success in the Kremlin’s eyes, and to encourage Russia to invest more efforts in developing 
this success. 
 
How does Russia’s soft power work? 
 
To understand how Russia's soft power is exercised in the 'West', we need to look at distinct 
audiences that are particularly sensitive to Russia's strategic narratives. These audiences can 
be described as 'communities of grievances'. Their grievances exist independently from 
Russia, but they are amplified and shaped with the help of Russian propaganda. They include 
various anti-establishment sentiments both on the right and on the left of the political spectrum: 
Eurosceptic, anti-American, anti-immigration and anti-globalisation sentiments, grievances 
related to austerity policies, etc. As correctly noted in a recent report on information warfare, 
‘the Kremlin does not need to itself create movements against immigration or the EU. All it 
needs is to fan the flames of existing campaigns’.29 
 
Many ‘communities of grievances’ function as echo chambers. Often connected through social 
media, they circulate those messages that are consistent with their views and reject any 
messages that can potentially challenge their opinions. Russia’s strategic narratives, 
disseminated through its propaganda instruments and other overt and covert methods of 
engaging with civil society actors in targeted countries, are carefully tailored to specific 
concerns of these ‘communities’. They appeal to and amplify their feelings of distrust towards 
the political establishment, mainstream political parties and mainstream media. For example, 
RT – one of Russia’s key propaganda outlets – prides itself on ‘cover[ing] stories overlooked 
by the mainstream media, provid[ing] alternative perspectives on current affairs, and 
acquaint[ing] international audiences with a Russian viewpoint on major global events’.30 By 
adapting its messages to specific concerns, Russia’s strategic narratives are able to penetrate 
the echo chambers. 
 
A recent report published by the RAND Corporation describes Russia’s propaganda as a 
‘firehose of falsehood’ – because of both its intensity and ‘a shameless willingness to 
disseminate partial truths or outright fictions’.31 Depending on the outlet, Russia’s narratives 
vary in the extent of their anti-Western or anti-establishment focus, and in the extent of their 
use of fake news. At the same time, they often openly challenge the ideas of balanced 
reporting, objectivity or impartiality, and promote the view that all media reporting is 
fundamentally biased – a narrative that aims to undermine the audiences’ trust of the 
mainstream media even further.  
 
By amplifying existing grievances, Russia’s narratives aim to weaken its opponents and to 
create more favourable conditions for achieving its foreign policy goals. As convincingly 
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argued by an expert in Russian propaganda, ‘the Kremlin's overall goal is to insert divisions 
between the Western allies that have imposed sanctions against it and in doing so, erode 
support for continuing such measures’.32 
 
The reach of Russia’s soft power 
 
The channels through which Russia disseminates its strategic narratives vary in the extent of 
their visibility. Some (including Russia’s alleged financial support of various political parties 
and civil society actors across Europe, or numerous pro-Kremlin websites) operate in a covert 
manner.33 Others, such as the RT television network or its sister multimedia service Sputnik, 
are open about their Russian origin (although the former did change its original name of 
‘Russia Today’ to the less conspicuous name of ‘RT’, which can be interpreted as an attempt 
to mislead some audiences).  
 
RT has received most attention in the ongoing debate on Russia’s soft power, particularly 
since the publication of the declassified version of the report on Russian influence prepared 
in the US by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 
and the National Security Agency (NSA) in January 2017. 34 Created in December 2005, RT 
network at the time of writing includes news channels in English, Arabic and Spanish. In 
addition, it includes a documentary channel RTDoc (in English and Russian), a video news 
agency RUPTLY, and online news platforms in Russian, German, and French.35 
 
The size of the RT weekly audience, according to the network’s own data based on the findings 
of a 2015 Ipsos survey, exceeds 36 million people in 10 European countries, 8 million viewers 
in the US, and additional 11 million across the Middle East and Africa.36 Its on-line audience 
appears even more significant. According to RT’s official webpage, it is ‘the #1 TV news 
network on the platform [YouTube] with more than 4 billion views across its channels and 4.5 
million subscribers’.37 
 
Yet the actual size of RT audience remains disputed. For example, according to the weekly 
viewing summary of the UK’s Broadcasters’ Audience Research Board (BARB), during the 
week of 5-11 December 2016 the share of RT in average weekly viewing among residential 
households in the UK was only 0.05%.38 Compared to mainstream TV channels, this share is 
very small. RT’s on-line reach is significantly more important. However, the overall YouTube 
numbers can also be misleading if taken as an indication of the reach of Russia’s strategic 
narratives. For example, at the time of writing, the most popular videos on RT’s YouTube 
channel are: ‘Meteorite crash in Russia: Video of meteor explosion that stirred panic in Urals 
region’ (more than 39 million views), ‘'Golden Voice' homeless man finds job, home after viral 
video success’ (more than 37million views) and ‘Japan Earthquake: Helicopter aerial view 
video of giant tsunami waves’ (more than 35 million views). 
 
Moreover, measuring the impact of Russia’s strategic narratives remains problematic. The 
size of audiences cannot tell us much about the extent to which these audiences have actually 
changed their understandings of the world or their political preferences. While public opinion 
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surveys can give us some insight into the changing distribution of positive or negative views 
of Russia in other countries, and, for example, the extent of public support for sanctions 
against Russia, it is significantly more difficult to trace whether these views are indeed shaped 
by Russian propaganda. Despite wide-spread alarmist warnings that ‘Russian propaganda 
wins EU hearts and minds’,39 we need significantly more evidence to establish in what way it 
may or may not have affected distinct audiences.  
 
At the same time, the key advantage of Russia’s propaganda outlets, including RT, is that they 
can easily penetrate the echo chambers of ‘communities of grievances’ discussed above. 
Thus, while their overall audience may be significantly smaller than what alarmist reports often 
suggest, their ability to amplify anti-establishment grievances poses a serious challenge both 
to the domestic stability of Russia’s opponents and to the unity of their responses to Russia’s 
international behaviour. 
 
Addressing the challenge of Russia’s soft power 
 
 We need to gain a significantly deeper understanding of how distinct audiences across 
the world engage with Russia’s strategic narratives. We should pay particular attention 
to various ‘communities of grievances’ in order to establish how they consume and 
spread Russia’s narratives through their echo chambers. A more difficult task is to 
establish how their engagement with Russia’s narratives affects their political 
preferences and shapes, or does not shape, their behaviour. 
 
 The rapidly changing mass media and social media environment makes it increasingly 
important to raise the standards of fact-checking by media outlets, to strengthen the 
quality of media regulation, to publicise examples of any disinformation campaigns and 
to invest more resources in improving the levels of media literacy among media 
consumers.  
 
 While the above measures are critically important, they are unlikely to be sufficient in 
relation to those ‘communities of grievances’ that are particularly sensitive to Russia’s 
strategic narratives. Due to their distrust of the mainstream media and the political 
establishment, they are highly unlikely to be persuaded by any attempts by mainstream 
media or official bodies to expose the biases or falsifications in Russia's narratives 
(and in narratives amplified by Russia) with the help of fact-checking. 
 
Thus, counteracting Russia's narratives targeted at these 'communities of grievances' 
is unlikely to work through purely communication means. Instead of treating it as a 
communication problem, it is extremely important to address those grievances that lie 
at the foundation of their dissatisfaction with the political establishment.   
 
Yet, this much bigger issue is often downplayed if not ignored in the policy debate, with 
most recommendations on how to counteract Russia’s propaganda being purely 
communicative. For example, the European Parliament’s resolution of 23 November 
2016 ‘on EU strategic communication to counteract propaganda against it by third 
parties’ emphasises that ‘the EU needs to put out its positive message about its 
successes, values and principles with determination and courage, and that it needs to 
be offensive in its narrative, not defensive’. At the same time, the resolution speaks of 
the need of ‘combatting the prejudices of local populations’.40 
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 It is increasingly important to encourage a more inclusive expert debate on Russia. 
The ongoing propaganda panic creates an exceptionally difficult environment for a 
healthy debate. Those experts who attempt to undertake a balanced analysis, are often 
accused of being part of Russian propaganda. This is a dangerous tendency which 
can have a negative effect on the ability of 'Western' countries to assess Russia's 





Russian Normative Power: The Legal Dimension 
Natasha Kuhrt (King’s College London, UK) 
 
Defining normative power 
 
Over the past decade the normative dimension of Russian power has acquired increasing 
importance. ‘Normative’ is here understood as being strongly based on international law and 
institutions, and a universal yardstick for measuring foreign policy. Russia has promoted itself 
as a guardian of international law, demonstrating strong continuity between both Soviet and 
Tsarist practices.41 
 
Normative power can also be seen as ‘setting the standard’ or laying down the law. For Russia, 
normative power consists of resistance to US hegemony, at both regional and global levels, 
and of resistance to what Russia sees as Washington’s attempts to overturn existing 
international norms. Furthermore, the issue of intervention has become increasingly 
intertwined with domestic development – an increasingly significant dimension in the Russian 
case. 
 
Normative power can also be understood as the ability to change the ‘rules of the game’ 42 
through persuasion, argumentation, and deliberation, based on norms which others can see 
have greater validity beyond simply national interest or European values. This argumentation 
and deliberation dimension to normative power in the form of legitimation can also be seen as 
a discourse. 
 
Unsettled international environments often see multiple states engaging in actions that 
challenge existing norms. Arguably the international environment has been particularly 
‘unsettled’ since 9/11. As far as policymakers in the Kremlin are concerned, this has led to 
chaos and instability, and a failure to adhere to norms that were agreed upon in the Helsinki 
Final Act, enshrined in the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, later 
OSCE). In Russia’s view, the West, and the US in particular, has attempted to overturn this 
order on a number of occasions. The intervention in Kosovo was the first attempt, although 
the bombing of Yugoslavia in the mid-1990s was already seen as going beyond the scope of 
the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions/mandate. 
 
Moscow saw the ‘illegal yet legitimate’ assessment of the Independent commission on Kosovo 
as the slippery slope, which arguably prepared the ground for the US to take action in Iraq 
without explicit UNSC authorization. While Russia condemned the intervention in Iraq as 
illegitimate, the US did in fact attempt to construct a legal argument via the so-called ‘revival 
argument’, rather than simply one based on legitimacy. Where legal arguments were not 
accepted, legitimacy was invoked to plug the gap: many legal scholars supported this. The 
very need to invoke legitimacy implies that existing international law is in some sense deficient 
or nonresponsive to a perceived urgency. One of the US‘ prime arguments for the intervention 
in Iraq in 2003 was that the UNSC had itself failed in its role as a guardian of international 
order and that there was law ‘outside the Charter’ that allowed Permanent 5 (P5) members to 
enforce UNSC resolutions where the UN had failed to uphold them. 
 
The blurring of legality and legitimacy that began to be observable even before Kosovo, has 
introduced a more subjective notion of what international law means. This has not gone 
unnoticed by Russia which has ‘also started to widely use the term “legitimacy” instead of 
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Despite the strong emphasis in global discourse on international law,  paradoxically there are 
few specialists on international law either in Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs or in the State 
Duma, what has been termed ‘illiteracy in international law’, suggesting a disjuncture between 
policy and discourse.44 Crimea was annexed by Russia via a stage-managed referendum to 
give the appearance of legality: no actual force was used, and so Russia was able to state 
that all legal processes had been followed. Further, in case of any doubt regarding the legality 
requirement, Russia invoked legitimacy arguments based on Kosovo and referred explicitly to 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) opinion on Kosovar independence. 
 
Yet, establishing to what extent Russia’s ‘subversion’ of accepted norms has gained 
widespread acceptance is a difficult task. For example, President Trump praising Putin is not 
necessarily evidence of Russia’s normative power even if some might present it as such. It is 
in all likelihood more a side effect of Russian public diplomacy or propaganda. 
 
Where one might look for normative power is in the UN, for example, by examining voting 
patterns.  Yet, here we see relatively little inclination on the part of states to support Russia. 
This is significant given that Russia sees its role within the UNSC as the symbolic 
consolidation and concentration of Russian global power. 
 
At the same time, many non-Western states have viewed the weakening of sovereignty norms 
in global practice as internationally destabilising and threatening to their own autonomy in 
international affairs. Therefore, it could be suggested that Russia can use this constituency to 
its advantage. For example, several states have resisted the institutionalisation of emerging 
norms such as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) or intrusive economic and trade regimes. 
 
Thus, while Russia may indeed be disadvantaged in terms of international legal discourse due 
to it being a ‘non-native speaker’45 (quite literally that the lack of lawyers fluent in English 
means a lack of access to scholarly articles relevant to public international law), its role as a 
P5 member gives it ample opportunity to push back against UNSC resolutions which, while 
not law, nevertheless perform a legislative function of sorts. 
 
Russia’s lack of a ‘knowledge bank’ of expertise in the area of international law not only puts 
it a disadvantage, but leads further to a distancing from the realm of so-called cosmopolitan 
law. Russia’s failure to ratify the International Criminal Court (ICC) statute is further 
demonstration of this (although it should be noted that the US also ‘unsigned’, i.e. failed to 
ratify the statute). 
 
Intentions and Strategy 
 
Successive Russian Foreign Policy Concepts have warned that Russia would ‘counter the 
attempts by individual countries or groups of countries to revise the universally accepted 
norms of international law enshrined in universal documents such as the UN Charter’. The 
2013 concept further stressed that ‘attempts to portray violations of international law as its 
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“creative” application, are especially detrimental to international peace, law and order. Such 
actions erode the basis of international law and inflict a lasting damage to its authority.’ 
 
There are three possible positions on Russia as a normative power. Firstly, that it does not 
respect or it rejects Western norms, i.e. that we are living a in an order based on global norms 
which have been largely constructed by the West. Secondly, that it wishes to create different 
norms, its own normative order. Or, thirdly, something in-between, i.e. that it wishes to be co-
creator with the West of a normative order. 
 
This report argues that the latter is closest to the reality, i.e. that Russia does not necessarily 
wish to be either ‘norm-maker’ or ‘norm-taker’ but rather a ‘norm buddy’. However, this rests 
also on the assumption of a kind of Monroe Doctrine and acceptance of ideas of spheres of 
influence in the former Soviet space, which may not correspond to EU or US policies. 
 
Probability of success 
 
While less a result of Russia’s normative power as such, Russian disquiet regarding Western 
normative pressure is not a cry in the wilderness. For example, the growing dissatisfaction 
with the use of the ICC by some African states is a case in point. As one scholar notes, ‘[A]n 
analysis of UNSC action which focuses entirely on Russia and China misses the justifications 
they give for their positions, which are based on some fairly widely shared beliefs about P3 
abuses of R2P and the ICC.’46 
 
In response, many have resisted the institutionalisation of emerging norms such as R2P. As 
a result of the selectivity with which western powers have chosen to use R2P, as argued by 
an Indian ambassador, ‘the noble idea of R2P will come into disrepute. Indeed, the Libyan 
case has already given R2P a bad name.’47 
 
Tracing the success of Russia’s normative power in its immediate neighbourhood is more 
difficult. As Russia has acted as regional hegemon, the emerging hierarchical order makes it 
harder to see a convergence of norms between Russia and the states here. 
 
Implications and Recommendations 
 
It is important to engage Russian diplomats and academics, in particular those working on 
international law, in regular discussions in order to understand better their outlook. It is also 
important to promote academic exchange in areas such as public international law, as 
Russia’s aversion to normative and ethical developments in international law has kept its 
lawyers sealed off from Western colleagues. 
 
Moreover, there is a lack of clarity in concepts such as self-determination, argues legal scholar 
Thomas Grant48, suggesting that Russia, ‘in working to keep us from responding to its 
aggression, exploits our failure to understand and to apply international law’, concluding that 
Russian interventionism ‘heralds a defeat in terms of the law’.  Thus, developing clearer legal 
arguments will be the best way of countering Russia’s normative challenge. This is particularly 
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important because Russia tries to challenge what it views as subjective moralizing with 
‘objective’ and ‘impartial’ legal arguments. 
 
Situations such as the Kosovo advisory opinion in 2010, when the ICJ refused to pronounce 
on what it called ‘the unfinished business of politicians’, do not help. Many states, in their 
depositions to the ICJ on Kosovo, failed to base any of their argumentation in international 
law. This simply feeds Russian criticism. We must continue to use international legal 
arguments at our disposal where they are available, rather than quasi ethical-legal arguments, 
and to be as clear as possible about the sources of international law. 
 
There are clear dangers of associating ‘normative’ with ethical considerations in particular as 
values and norms can be interpreted differently by different actors: take self-determination. 
There is still no agreed objective definition of what self-determination means in practice. 
Arriving at such a definition would necessitate the production of sound legal arguments. 
 
Although Russia’s actions in Crimea have been condemned and the creation of a new legal 
norm has been resisted, it may be easier for some actors now to ‘undermine the old law’. 
Relying only on arguments based on legitimacy dislocates legality and invites non-liberal 
states to fill the vacuum by producing legal arguments. Legitimacy can be viewed as 
comprising moral, and political standards as well as legal ones, making it an inherently flexible 
and malleable tool for policymakers. Russia’s deployment of this ‘language’ is an essential 
component of its bid to contain attempts to revise the ‘results of the Second World War’. In 
this sense, contrary to some views, Russia is emphatically an anti-revisionist power. 
 
As suggested by a Russian expert Andrey Kortunov, Russian analysts are not completely 
wrong to argue that the Kremlin has opted to “depriv[e] the West of the monopoly over 
breaching the norms of international law”.  The West’s outrage regarding Russian breaches 
of law carries less weight and authority in large part because of the widespread sense that the 
global legal structure has been delegitimized after Iraq. Even amongst UK lawyers and 
policymakers this is acknowledged: “[T]he current discourse that accepts unlawful actions 
because they are ‘legitimate’ is having a detrimental effect in allowing illegal forms of use of 
force. The danger was that in using the term ‘legitimacy’, moral approval was extended to 
actions that were illegal.” 49 
 
Ultimately Russia is concerned by these developments because they underline the uncertainty 
regarding the prevailing international norms and bring into question the locus of authority in 
international society, thus questioning the notion of Great Power Management and sovereign 
equality, and the UNSCs’ primary role in maintaining international peace and security, and 
therefore Russia’s role within this. In a way, what Russia is saying is that legitimacy holds only 
to the extent that everyone has had a say in or participated in discourses or discussions around 
rules. 
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Russian Power: Domestic Challenges 
 
Hanna Smith (University of Helsinki, Aleksanteri Institute) 
 
 
Recent events in Ukraine and Syria have contributed to the perception of Russia as a powerful 
player on the international arena, most notably in Europe. Russia’s “hybrid warfare” operation 
to annex Crimea, military involvement in Eastern Ukraine and military support for Bashar Al-
Assad’s regime in Syria all emphasize Russia’s strengths. Growing nationalism in Western 
countries, the immigration crisis in Europe, Brexit, the election of Donald Trump as President 
of the United States, and the manipulation of information by various means including through 
lies have also made Russia appear stronger and enjoying substantial advantages over 
Western countries and their democracies. But the domestic challenges that Russia is facing 
present a very different picture from that of a strong, capable or efficient Russia. 
 
The Russian state suffers from clear structural weaknesses - weak institutions, corruption, 
huge regional differences and a diverse population in terms of religion (around 15 per cent of 
the population is Muslim) and ethnicity (81 per cent of the population is Russian according to 
the 2010 census, but some minority groups can be rather influential. A Russia Forbes study 
in 2014 on the 200 wealthiest business people showed that only 44.5 per cent out of the 200 
wealthiest were ethnic Russians). This means that if Russia wants to be portrayed as a strong 
state, it is essential for Moscow to deploy narratives and strategic myths which reinforce 
Russia’s standing as a Great Power. This trend has always been present in the Russian 
domestic political context, but at times when Russia’s internal situation and the position of 
power elites have been unstable, it has played an even stronger role. The quest for recognition 
as a Great Power, inherited from Russia’s past, plays an important role in its foreign policy but 
also features in domestic policy as a screen for other weaknesses. 
 
When Vladimir Putin began his third presidential term, the popularity of the power elite was 
very low. Russians felt let down by their leaders. Another factor, from the Russian political 
elite’s perspective, was that the world around Russia appeared to be becoming more 
competitive and threatening. There were challenges to the power elite from both inside and 
outside. The policy implication was that more effort needed to be devoted to security provision 
both domestically and externally. Although some measures addressed both sets of 
challenges, this report focuses on the domestic side.  
 
These uncertainties resulted in two different trends in the domestic arena: the securitization of 
Russian society and a more active process of building a strong state. The securitization of the 
state – meaning it exerts more control over society – has mostly been executed through 
legislation. In 2014 President Putin signed a law that introduced substantial fines and/or a 
sentence of up to several months in prison for taking part in demonstrations, holding meetings 
and rallies multiple times during a six month period. Another law increased prison terms for 
calling publicly for anything that might “violate the territorial integrity of the Russian 
Federation”.  Individuals can receive up to four years in prison, instead of three, while appeals 
made via the media and the Internet can lead to a five-year prison term.  
 
A further law will force any Internet company operating in Russia to store Russian clients’ 
personal data. Other legislation has restricted foreign ownership of Russian media, and the 
controversial “foreign-agent” law forced any NGO receiving foreign funding and engaged in 
political activity to be branded as a foreign agent. According to Amnesty International this led 
to 27 NGOs closing their doors. New laws relating to the Internet oblige companies to provide 
the Federal Security Service (FSB) with keys to their encryption, and also allow the FSB 
access to any user's messaging data without a court order. All metadata on websites must be 
stored for one year, while other forms of metadata need to be stored for three years. Under 
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the banner of the war against terrorism several existing laws have been amended and new 
laws grant the authorities the power to monitor, gather information, limit freedom of movement 
or restrict actions like missionary activities if seen as necessary. This is only the peak of a vast 
mountain of legislation that allows the state to penetrate people’s everyday lives. The aim is 
to ensure that the state is able to exercise control and has the legal means to act, should civic 
unrest occur in Russia. 
 
The second trend of building a strong state image and presenting Russia as a Great Power is 
not a new one. Yet it has accelerated since 2012 and has risen to new heights since the 2014 
annexation of Crimea.  
 
When Putin first came to power in 2000, he was seen as the first post-modern Russian leader 
as he rejected ideology as a guide to policy and instead appeared to take a pragmatic 
approach.. However Putin’s view as to whether Russia needs an ideology as evidenced by 
his increasing emphasis on a ‘national idea appear to have changed over time, demonstrating 
a certain inconsistency. In 2004, Putin said at a meeting with his closest confidants that the 
Russian national idea was centred on competitiveness: “[A] person must be competitive, as 
well as towns, villages, industries and the whole country. That is our fundamental national idea 
today”. This sentiment was also expressed in his state of the nation speech. Yet in 2011, in 
an interview with the Russian magazine VIP-Premier, Putin said that the Russian national idea 
was in “preserving people”, to quote Alexander Solzhenitsyn -this refers to people’s wellbeing, 
demographics and the welfare state. In 2012 Russian national idea became a very important 
aspect of Putin’s policies. In September that year Putin held a meeting in Krasnodar, where 
he spoke about the values and moral foundations needed for Russia’s future. In 2013 at the 
annual Valdai Club meeting he saw the Russian national idea as rooted in Russia’s own 
historical traditions while also rejecting Soviet ideology, imperial conservatism or “extreme, 
Western-style liberalism”.  
 
The Kremlin’s propaganda efforts brought to the foreground a number of core beliefs about 
Russia: its status as a great power, its exceptionalism, and the necessity of rejecting liberal 
democracy as “hostile” to and in contradiction to Russian patriotism. Over the past few years, 
patriotism together with military preparedness has increasingly been associated with 
defending the country from external and internal criticism. The Russian political regime has 
embarked on a “Patriotic Policy” which seeks to engage the public in a state of “patriotic 
mobilization”. In autumn 2016 the policy evolved into a proposal for a new law that would 
define a national idea for Russia. Alexander Verkhovsky, writing in The Moscow Times, saw 
three possible reasons for the proposed law: firstly to create a tool for officials in their endless 
struggles among themselves for power and financial resources; secondly as a symbolic 
gesture indicating  that the state supports an understanding of the Russian nation as a broad 
political unity; and thirdly to tie the Russian Orthodox church and Russian ethnicity in with 
national security issues under the banner of “the ideology of new state nationalism.”  
 
Both trends – the securitization of society and building a strong state image – are buttressed 
by strategic myths that persist in relation to Russian history. Two myths that are particularly 
strong in Russian collective memory and history writing are the myth of Russia as an eternal 
great power (facing a constant external threat), and of Russia as regularly riven by periods of 
internal unrest (facing a constant internal threat).  
 
The myth of Russia as an eternal great power includes a number of elements. Victory and 
heroes are important among them: The Great Patriotic War (Second World War) has become 
an important national celebration for Russians and appears to have brought unity to Russian 
society. As Nikolai Petrov has stated, “there is absolutely nothing else in the whole of Russian 
history that can be used to unite the nation.” However, the way in which the victory in the Great 
Patriotic War has been promoted by officials has created a framework of “us” and “them” in 
history writing and has sparked “history wars” between Russia and several Eastern European 
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countries. While for Russian identity the Great Patriotic War is almost indispensable, it has 
contributed to separating Russia from Europe. Whereas in the past, memories of the Great 
Patriotic War served to unify Russia and Europe, but the way in which they are used and 
interpreted now, creates distance and dividing lines between Russia and other European 
countries. 
 
The second myth, of Russia as riven periodically by internal unrest, is a negative one. 
Inasmuch as it is deployed by the regime, it is immediately countered by a set of myths about 
Russia’s unique civilizational role, which are intended to promote a united society. However, 
just as the myth of the Great Patriotic War drives a wedge between Russia and Europe, so 
the civilizational myth can end up dividing society, not uniting it. The civilizational argument, 
stressing Russia as a unique Eurasian civilization, has been used to promote unity in Russian 
society and enhance the strong state image. In October 2012 Putin signed a decree 
establishing a new agency within the presidential administration, the Directorate for Social 
Projects. The main goal of the directorate was defined as strengthening the spiritual and moral 
foundations of Russian society and improving state policies in the area of patriotic education. 
Reactions to the initiative were mixed in Russia, but the policy ever since has been very 
consistent.  
 
One shared feature of the discourses of a unique civilization, Russia as a Great Power, and 
official patriotism, is the use of anti-Westernism and anti-Americanism in Russian society. This 
is nothing new: there is a long history in tsarist Russia, the Soviet Union and also post-Soviet 
Russia of blaming outside forces for Russia’s problems and portraying “the West” as a threat. 
Nevertheless, when this becomes a dominant feature in the Kremlin’s policy it is a sign of 
weakness rather than of strength. It should be noted that this anti-westernism presents a 
contradiction: many Russians feel that the West is “out to get Russia” while at the same time 
they feel part of Europe. Ultimately, European civilization appeals more naturally to Russians 
than the Eurasian civilization argument. 
 
The image of a strong Russia with efficient decision making is readily portrayed when it comes 
to military actions abroad. However, the image changes significantly when looking at domestic 
politics, and especially the two main trends: building an image of Russia as a Great Power 
with official patriotism and civilizational arguments; and the securitization of society, especially 
through the legal framework. The Higher School of Economics in Moscow carried out a study 
in 2013 where they identified four major political streams in Russian society: liberals, leftists, 
nationalists, and supporters of the ruling regime. This is slightly different from the traditional 
triangle among the foreign policy schools: westernisers, eurasianists/statists and slavophiles.  
Both models show that there is diversity in Russian society which already undermines the idea 
that a single “official patriotism” could be successfully implanted, and the quest for unity 
promotes a framework of “us” and “them” more than real unity. Opinion polls even indicate 
that despite the Kremlin’s patriotic policy, the majority of Russians believe that patriotism is a 
deep and intimate feeling that cannot be commanded or directed from above.  
 
Societal securitization through legislation parallels the strong state, great power and 
civilizational initiatives which are slowly distancing society from the political elite, constantly 
undermining the efficiency of the state, and putting brakes on any fundamental structural 
changes. To convert its social potential into strength, Russia needs to turn its diversity into a 
real unity, not pushing some parts of society out while trying to control society through threats.  
Konstantin Kosachev has correctly defined the core reason for Russia’s current predicament: 
it lies, he notes, in the fact that present-day Russia has taken up the role of the legal successor 
of the Soviet Union, which brings into the core of today’s Russian politics not the Soviet 
ideology, or its political and economic system, but ideas of a strong state, the quest for a 
powerful position in the international arena, promoting Russia as a leading nation globally, and 
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